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UNCERTAINTY AND REVERSE PAYMENTS
RAMSI A. WOODCOCK*

The current approach to "reverse payment" settlements of drug
patent litigation seeks to preclude only those settlements guaranteed
to harm consumers, rather than all that could harm them. Antitrust
tolerates the possibility of harm in order to give firms the freedom to
make settlements that might benefit consumers, relative to what
courts would achieve under patent law. Antitrust's mission is not,
however, to improve upon outcomes under patent law, but rather to
prevent harm to consumers. Accordingly, antitrust must minimize
the possibility of harm, even if that precludes the chance of gain. I
show that a ban on all settlements that fix a date of entry, regardless
of the existence of a reverse payment or the number of generic
challengers, is the best way to do that.
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INTRODUCTION

It is hard to discover a chemical compound that is safe and
effective at treating illness, but easy to copy it. As a result, the firm
that discovers a new drug ("Brand") faces stiff price competition
from copycats, which are known as generics. A patent allows Brand
to earn a return on its investment by excluding generics from the
market for the duration of the patent's term. However, because of
the great value of monopoly, Brand sometimes abuses the patent
system by suing a generic ("Generic") to exclude it from the market
even when it is not entitled to do so.
Any suit by Brand to exclude Generic may be resolved by a final
order of the court deciding the appropriate date of entry for Generic
under patent law. But Brand and Generic sometimes settle the suit
instead by agreeing on a date upon which Generic may enter the
market (an "entry settlement"). In so doing, Brand and Generic
interpose a privately-negotiated patent term for the one that patent
law would impose through the final order of the court hearing the
case.
Antitrust's job is to prevent the parties from using the private
law of their settlement contract to set a new term that makes
consumers worse off than they would be under the one chosen by the
court using patent law.1 I call this mission antitrust's "protection

1. Sometimes, as here, I mean by "antitrust" or "antitrust law" not the set of
U.S. statutes and caselaw regulating competitive practices, the most famous of which
are the prohibitions on cartels and monopolization in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
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standard" because it seeks to protect consumers from harm. It
follows
from
this
standard
that
antitrust
should
eliminate settlements that could harm consumers, even if there is
uncertainty whether they actually will, so long as doing so would not
otherwise interfere with antitrust's mission. I call this the
"uncertainty corollary" to the protection standard because it tells
antitrust how to handle settlements of uncertain effect on
consumers.
Antitrust is in violation of the uncertainty corollary because it
has accepted a possibility of harm to consumers in order to pursue
an illegitimate end. Antitrust has squandered much intellectual
effort over the past two decades trying to find a way to preserve the
right of the parties to decide on a new term when they settle. In
order to preserve that right, antitrust allows the possibility that the
parties will instead choose a term that harms consumers.
Antitrust's hope, despite the absence of any supporting
evidence, 2 is that the settling parties might choose a new term that
would make consumers even better off than they would be under the
one that the court would set using patent law. 3 But making
consumers better off than they would be under the outcome dictated
by the court using patent law is not part of antitrust's mission. As a
matter of institutional deference, antitrust must treat the term that
patent law would impose through the court as the best possible
outcome for consumers. Preserving the opportunity of firms to make
beneficial settlements is therefore alien to antitrust's mission in this
area. Antitrust must stop trying to preserve the possibility of benefit
at the cost of its proper mission of minimizing the possibility of
harm.
Reversing a common feature of settlements of patent litigation,
in which Generic pays Brand for infringing a valid patent, Brand
often makes a payment to Generic as part of an entry settlement.
Antitrust regulates entry settlements only when they include these
"reverse payments," which can run to hundreds of millions of
dollars. 4 The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which estimates

1, 2 (2013), but instead the body of scholars, judges, antitrust lawyers, and other
policymakers who influence the nature and application of these laws.
2. For evidence that the parties tend to make settlements that harm
consumers, see infra note 65.
3. See infra notes 14 & 15, and accompanying text.

4. See C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New
Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 64757 (2009) [hereinafter Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust] (giving many
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that consumers lose $3.5 billion per year from the delay in generic
entry that results from the payments, 5 has sought for years6 to
obtain harsh treatment7 for them.8 After showing some initial favor
to the FTC,9 courts refused to regulate such payments, initially
preferring instead to rule them per se legal,10 and only recently
relenting in part in the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Actavis,
which held that reverse payment entry settlements should be

examples

of

reverse

payment

amounts);

Drug Patent Settlements Between Rivals: A Survey
(unpublished manuscript, available
more data on such settlements).

C.

6-11

Scott

(Mar.

at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969492)

Hemphill,

12,

2007)

(including

5. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Pay for Delay: How Drug Company Payoffs Cost
Consumers Billions 2 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-

commission-staff-study/100 1 12payfordelayrpt.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2016).
6. See, e.g., Complaint, In the Matter of Abbott Labs., No. C-3945, 2000 WL
681848, at *1, *4-5 (Fed. Trade Comm'n May 22, 2000) (challenging a 1990s-era
reverse payment settlement).

7. Brief for the Petitioner at 33, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, 133 S.Ct. 2223,
33-40 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 267027 at *33 (calling for "quick look" review of
reverse payment settlements).
8.
See id. at 2, (defining "'reverse payment' agreements").

9. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding reverse payment per se illegal).
10.
The courts professed to apply a "scope of the patent" test to reverse
payment settlements. Under such a test, reverse payment settlements are legal
unless they extend Brands power beyond the scope of the patent by, for example,
preventing Generic from entering after the expiration of the patent term. See In re

Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Lit., 544 F.3d 1323, 1333-35 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(holding that reverse payment settlements are not anticompetitive unless they
exceed the scope of the patent, the patent was procured by fraud, or the patent

litigation was a sham); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187,
208-13 (2d Cir. 2005) (endorsing rule that only reverse payment settlements that
exceed the scope of the patent are reviewable for antitrust violations but adding an
exception for cases in which the patent suit was fraudulently brought as an excuse

for striking an agreement); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065-66
(11th Cir. 2005) (holding that reverse payment settlements are not per se illegal and
do not violate antitrust laws unless they exceed the "scope" of the patent grant);

Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2003)
(holding the same). I consider this a standard of per se legality for reverse payment

settlements. See Joshua P. Davis, Applying Litigation Economics to Patent
Settlements: Why Reverse Payments Should Be Per Se Illegal, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 255,
260 (2009) (describing the scope of the patent rule as "essentially involv[ing] a rule of
per se legality").
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subject to case-by-case review for legality, also known as "rule of
reason" treatment.1 1
A ban on all entry settlements,12 regardless whether they
involve a reverse payment, is the best rule that satisfies the
requirement that antitrust allow no harm. Both laissez faire and
any rule that allows a reverse payment, regardless of the amount,
allow delay and harm to consumers, and therefore violate the
protection standard. Antitrust's only policy alternatives are an
entry settlement ban, which meets the protection standard because
it ensures that consumers always achieve the value to which they
are entitled in litigation, a rule of reason, which requires review of
settlements for harm on a case-by-case basis, and a rule requiring
Generic to make a payment to Brand as part of any entry
settlement. I show that a rule requiring such an "obverse payment"
is unworkable. A rule of reason is too expensive, the Supreme
Court's embrace of one for reverse payment settlements
notwithstanding. A ban on entry settlements, which is not to be
confused with a ban on settlement generally, is therefore the best
option.
The antitrust economics literature is divided into a camp that
would ban reverse payments in excess of litigation cost (the
advocates of the "litigation cost rule") and one that would impose a
rule of reason. Both are concerned exclusively with the irrelevant
problem of finding a rule that does not preclude any settlements
that could benefit consumers. The literature reflects broad
agreement on the model to use to analyze entry settlements (the
"standard entry model"). 13 The litigation cost rule advocates use it to
show that entry settlements that include a payment from Brand to
Generic in excess of litigation cost hurt consumers. 14 The skeptics

11. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227, 2234-37 (2013)
(holding that a reverse payment settlement can violate Sherman Act § 1 and must be
evaluated under a rule of reason standard).
12. The discussion in this article is limited entirely to patent settlements that
fix the date of entry (and which may or may not include a reverse payment). Any
reference to settlement herein refers exclusively to such a patent entry settlement.
13. For a good basic introduction to the model, see Aaron Edlin et al.,
Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 22 (2013). For a more detailed exposition, see
Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements That Settle
Patent Litigation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 655 (2004).

14.

See Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67

RUTGERS U. L. REV. 585, 590 (2015); Einer Elhauge and Alex Krueger, Solving the
Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 297 (2012); Herbert Hovenkamp et al.,
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719,
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use it to show that if asymmetric information or risk aversion are
taken into account, some entry settlements involving payments in
excess of litigation cost do not hurt consumers and could even make
them better off. They argue that because such salutary results are
possible, a litigation cost rule is inappropriate and antitrust should
consider each entry settlement on a case-by-case basis. 1 5
In the standard entry model, only a small number of generics
may enter after settlement or litigation success, leading to duopoly
or oligopoly pricing until the end of the patent term. I call this the
"single entry" case. The skeptics have sought to undermine the
litigation cost rule by arguing that if large numbers of generics

1759-60 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J.
EcoN. 391, 407-08 (2003); Aaron S. Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs: A Reply to
Critics, 14 THE ANTITRUST SOURCE C1, C1 (2014); Aaron Edlin et al., supra note 13.
The conclusions of this camp have been endorsed by another scholar, who does not
directly discuss the model. See Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent
Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 63, 76
(2009) (relying on the work of Carl Shapiro).
The FTC probably belongs in or near this camp as well. In FTC v. Actavis, it
explicitly declined to call for a per se rule against any reverse payment. Supra note
7, at 33. ("Although there are abundant reasons to be skeptical of reverse-payment
agreements as a class, such agreements should not be treated as categorically
unlawful, because per se condemnation would foreclose consideration of possible
legitimate justifications for the payment or procompetitive potential that some such
agreements may have."). But it also opposed a full blown rule of reason approach. Id.
at 33-40.
15. See Willig and Bigelow, supra note 13, at 677-78; Barry C. Harris et al.,
Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 28 ANTITRUST 83, 87-88 (2014). For a
more accessible summary of these arguments, see generally Marc G. Schildkraut,
Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
1033 (2004).
A third camp argues that the model demands a per se rule against reverse
payments generally. See Davis, supra note 10, at 261-64; Catherine E. Creely,
Prognosis Negative: Why the Language of the Hatch-Waxman Act Spells Trouble for
Reverse Payment Agreements, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 155, 171-73, 185-86 (2006)
(arguing for a reverse payment ban on the ground that reverse payment settlements
mostly redistribute wealth between producers instead of creating greater incentives
for innovation and the deadweight loss they inflict on consumers is large); Cristofer
Leffler and Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy over Patent Settlements: Payments
by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, 21 RES. IN L. & ECON.: ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. 475, 476 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004) (arguing that benefits from reverse
payment settlements are rare and therefore reverse payments should be banned);
Michael Owens, A Cure for Collusive Settlements: The Case for a Per Se Prohibition
on Pay-for-Delay Agreements in PharmaceuticalPatent Litigation, 78 Mo. L. REV.
1353, 1399 (2013) (arguing that because producers always have an incentive to harm
consumers through reverse payment settlements, the costs of allowing reverse
payment settlements must exceed the costs of banning such settlements).
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enter to drive price to competitive levels before the expiration of the
patent term, some large payments do not hurt consumers.16 I call
this the "multiple entry" case. I show that an entry settlement ban
is appropriate under both single and multiple entry.17
I proceed as follows. I first use the standard entry model to
define the range of possible entry dates to which the parties may
agree in settlement when a reverse payment or an obverse payment
is available.1 8 As part of this discussion, I trace the efforts of
scholars to defend the litigation cost rule on the ground that it does
not preclude any settlements that benefit consumers. I next use this
settlement range to challenge the common observation that reverse
payment settlements harm consumers because a reverse payment
causes the interests of consumers and Generic to diverge. 19 I show
that even in the absence of a reverse payment, the incentives of
Generic and consumers diverge, which is why I cannot merely rely
on a ban on reverse payments, let alone a litigation cost rule, to
preclude the possibility of harm to consumers through settlement. I
then introduce the protection standard,2 0 defend the uncertainty
corollary,2 1 discuss the current approach to uncertainty,2 2
demonstrate that laissez faire and a reverse payment cap fail the
uncertainty corollary, 23 and show that a settlement ban is the best
rule that satisfies it.24 Throughout, I show that my results apply
equally in the case of multiple generic entrants.
I. THE STANDARD ENTRY MODEL
In this Part, I provide some institutional detail, give a full
account of the standard entry model, and use it to identify the range
of dates of entry upon which Brand and Generic may settle.2 5 This
range is important because a settlement entry date that delays

16.

See Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 612-13;

Bruce H. Kobayashi et al., Actavis and Multiple ANDA
Temporary Duopoly, 29 ANTITRUST 89, 95 (2015).

Entrants: Beyond the

17. I note any changes in my analysis required by the multiple entry case as
they arise throughout this article.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.
22. See infra Part III. C.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. For the sources upon which this account is based, see supra note 13.
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entry relative to the date of entry that might be permitted by a
court harms consumers. I determine the range of possible entry
dates to which the parties may agree if they are permitted to use
settlement to avoid litigation costs. 26 I then extend the analysis to
the case in which the parties may include a reverse or obverse
payment in their settlement. Thereafter, I explain the debate over
the litigation cost rule in terms of the model 2 7 and extend the
analysis to the case of multiple generic entrants.2 8 With the
exception of the obverse payment analysis, the model I describe here
is the standard model that has already been developed in the
literature. It is essential, however, to the argument that follows.
A. Some InstitutionalBackground
I am concerned with settlements of litigation regarding patents
covering drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
("FDA"). The Hatch-Waxman Act 29 regulates challenges by Generic
to patents covering such drugs. 30 The act determines how Generic
may seek to enter the market and Brand may use its patents to
prevent it from doing so. Under the act, prior to entering the
market, Generic must obtain approval from the FDA for its generic
version of the drug. 3 1 When it applies for such approval, it must
declare its belief that it is entitled to enter the market because
Brand's patent is invalid or will not be infringed (a "Paragraph IV
certification"). 3 2 Brand is then accorded the opportunity to
immediately sue Generic for violating its patent rights and may
obtain a thirty-month stay on approval of the generic drug pending
the outcome of litigation. 33 If Generic wins and it is the first
company to try to enter the generic market for the drug in this way,
the law accords it 180 days of marketing exclusivity, after which
other generic competitors may enter the market as well. 34

26. See infra Part I.C.1.
27. See infra Part I.C.2.
28. See infra Part I.D.
29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012).
30. See Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417,
419-26 (2011).
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).

32.
33.
34.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012).
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B. The Model without Litigation Costs
1. The Setup of the Model
The foundation of any model is a stylized set of behaviors; that
is, a story. The model takes it as given and explores its
consequences. The story underlying the standard entry model is
this. Brand has a patent on an aspect of a drug that is essential
enough to its production that the patent gives Brand the power to
exclude competitors in the drug market. Brand goes to court to use
its patent to exclude Generic from the market. 35 If Brand loses,
Generic enters the market immediately. If Brand wins, Generic
enters on the patent expiration date. Whether Brand will win is
uncertain. Brand and Generic can settle their dispute. As part of
any settlement, Brand and Generic agree on an entry date, which
need neither be immediate nor at the end of the patent term, but
can lie somewhere in between. 36 I assume that Brand and Generic
are rational, share expectations regarding the litigated outcome,
and are not risk averse. 37
Having set forth the underlying story of the model, I make some
initial observations about it. When Brand is alone in the market, it
will charge a monopoly price, which is the price that maximizes
Brand's quasi-profit. 38 No other price will generate as much quasi-

35.

I simplify the regulatory situation considerably. See Part I.A.

36.
The model described here ignores the duration of litigation, assuming
instead that litigation or settlement negotiation take place instantaneously at the
earliest possible date of Generic entry, any litigation costs incurred are incurred
instantaneously at that time as well, and there are no settlement costs. In single
entry, Generic's first-filer exclusivity lasts until the expiration of the patent, whereas

in multiple entry, which I discuss in Part I.D, it lasts just 180 days.
Some commentators relax some of these assumptions. See Elhauge & Krueger,
supra note 14, at 298 (litigation takes place over a period of time and Generic may

&

choose to enter before resolution of the litigation); Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the
"PresumptiveIllegality"Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse
Payments: A Commentary on Hovenhamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789,
1802-04 (2002) (providing for the same); Sencer Ecer & Richard S. Higgins, A
Welfare Analysis of Prohibitions on Reverse Payments in Pharmaceutical Patent
Disputes, with and without the Hatch-Waxman Entry Injunction, 12 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 923, 923, 927 (2003) (modeling the thirty-month Hatch-Waxman stay on
litigation).
37. Some commentators relax these assumptions. See generally Willig
Bigelow, supranote 13; Schildkraut, supra note 15; Harris et al., supra note 15.
38.
Quasi-profit is Brand's profit before deduction of any fixed costs. See
ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, at Bk. V Ch. IX ¶ 27 n.87 (8th ed.
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profit from the sale of the drug to consumers as this monopoly
price. 39 When Generic enters, price falls to a duopoly 40 level, which
is below the monopoly price level but above the (zero quasi-profit)
competitive level. Brand remains in the market, and Brand and
Generic share the quasi-profit generated at the duopoly price level
for the remaining duration of the patent. I consider the multiple
entry case, in which profit falls to a competitive level, in Part I.D. It
is of great importance to the analysis that follows to observe that
because monopoly profit is by definition the greatest possible quasiprofit, duopoly quasi-profit is necessarily less than monopoly quasiprofit.41
Consumers, Brand, and Generic have conflicting interests when
it comes to deciding Generic's date of entry. Consumers want the
lowest possible price. When Brand is in the market alone and the
price is at a monopoly level, consumer value is at a minimum.
Brand takes a larger share of the potential value generated by the
drug (which is represented by the area under the large triangle
created by the downward sloping consumer demand line in Figure
1). Also, if pricing is uniform across all units of the drug sold, some
consumers who value the drug cannot afford it at a monopoly price
and therefore some of the potential value of the drug for consumers

1920). The two fixed costs discussed in this paper are litigation cost and the cost of
research and development.
39. See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 384 (1995)
(observing that a monopolist chooses its price to maximize its profits").
40. For convenience, I refer to "Generic" in the singular as the challenger and to
a "duopoly" when Brand and Generic are in the market together. However, I mean
these terms to include the case in which several generic firms may challenge the
patent at the same time or enter together. The only case these terms exclude is that
in which so many firms enter together initially as to drive price all the way down to
the competitive zero-profit level. Cf. Luke Olson & Brett W. Wendling, Estimating

the Effect of Entry on Generic Drug Prices Using Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity 13, 18,
35
(April
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2254059) (finding that entry pursuant to a Paragraph IV
certification results in no more than three generic entrants within eighteen months
of initial entry whereas more than three generic firms tend to enter at patent
expiry). In the single entry case, this happens only at expiration of the patent term.
In the multiple entry case that I discuss in Part ID, a large number of generics enter
the market 180 days after the initial entry of generics, driving price down from a
duopoly level to a competitive level.
41.
I assume that marginal cost is either negligible or approximately constant
over all units of production and the same in monopoly and duopoly markets for all
producers. So I ignore marginal cost. The cost of making pills and putting them in
bottles is constant and small relative to the demand for pills. In this Part I.B.1, I also
assume no fixed costs.
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is lost. This lost potential value is the area of the smaller triangle,
labeled DWL, in Figure 1 and is known as "deadweight loss."
When Generic enters the market, price falls to a duopoly level
and consumers gain because both some of the value once taken by
Brand is returned to consumers and the lower price makes the drug
affordable to some consumers who were once priced out of the
market. 42 But because price has not fallen to the zero profit level,
consumers still do not enjoy the entire value of the drug.43 That
happens only after the expiration of the patent, at which point many
generic drug makers enter the market and drive price to zero, 44
dissipating the power of producers to control any part of the value of
the drug and eliminating the last of the deadweight loss. 4 5
For consumers, the ideal date of entry is the earliest possible
date because that converts the entire monopoly pricing period into a
duopoly pricing period under which consumers enjoy more of the
value of the drug. 46 In the absence of a reverse payment, this is also
the preferred outcome for Generic, which makes a profit exclusively
during the duopoly period and would therefore like to see that
period maximized in length. 47 I show in Part II, however, that once
litigation costs are taken into account, Generic's interest is no
longer perfectly aligned with that of consumers, even in the absence
of a reverse payment.

42. This is depicted in Figure 2. In the figure, price is at duopoly price PD and
quantity is at qD. The dotted lines give the monopoly price and quantity that no
longer obtain in the market.
43. Some deadweight loss remains, as shown by the DWL triangle in Figure 2.
And producers continue to retain some value, as shown by the duopoly profit box in
the same figure.
44. That price can fall to zero without the market disappearing is a quirk of my
zero cost assumption. In a competitive market, firms make no economic profit, but
their owners do earn a return on their investment, which is treated as part of firms'
costs. This return gives owners their reason for staying in the competitive market. I
have assumed that fixed and marginal cost are zero, see supra note 41, meaning that
for some reason owners are happy to remain in the market even though they earn no
return. The model works as well when fixed and marginal costs are small.
45. This is depicted in Figure 3. In the figure, price Pc is zero and quantity qc is
at a maximum. The dotted lines give the monopoly and duopoly prices and quantities
that no longer obtain in the market.
46. The greater consumer value under duopoly is evident from a comparison of
Figure 1 and Figure 2, in which consumer value is depicted in grey.
47. This is reflected in Figure 4 through Figure 6, which give Generic's profit in
gray under each of the three pricing regimes. Note that Figure 5 shows Generic
receiving a share of duopoly profit of arbitrary size. Brand gets the rest of duopoly
profit, as shown in Figure 8.
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The interest of Brand is not aligned with that of consumers or
Generic. Brand profits more when in the market alone and enjoying
monopoly pricing than when in duopoly with Generic.4 8 Brand
would prefer that Generic not enter the market at all before patent
expiry, thereby converting all of the duopoly pricing period into a
monopoly pricing period.
Treating the values realized by consumers, Brand, and Generic
as realized per unit time, I graph them over the set of possible
Generic entry dates. The graph, which is Figure 12,49 shows that as
Generic's entry is delayed for an increasing period of time, consumer
value and Generic's profit fall, but Brand's profit increases,
reflecting the interest of consumers and Generic in early entry and
of Brand in the greatest possible delay. Brand's profit rises more
quickly than Generic's profit falls (i.e., Brand's profit line slopes
upward more steeply than Generic's slopes down in Figure 12).
There are two reasons for this. First, Brand must share duopoly
profit with Generic whereas Brand can keep all of its monopoly
profit for itself. Second, as I noted above, monopoly profit is greater
than duopoly profit.
2. Delay and Reverse Payments
Because Brand's gain from delay exceeds Generic's loss, Brand
can always afford to fully compensate Generic for the losses it
suffers from delay and to split the remaining surplus with Generic,
thereby making it worthwhile for Brand and Generic to agree to
entry delay.50 In other words, delay increases the profit pie

48.

This is reflected in Figure 7 through Figure 9, which give Brand's quasi-

profit in gray under each of the three pricing regimes. Brand's profit box under
monopoly is larger than that under duopoly, so it prefers monopoly pricing. Note that
Figure 8 shows Brand receiving a share of duopoly profit of arbitrary size. Generic
gets the rest, as shown in Figure 5.
49.
In Figure 12, the v"e line gives Brands profit as a function of entry date,

the vGet line gives Generic's profit as a function of entry date, and the CS line gives
consumer value as a function of entry date.
50. This is reflected in Figure 10 and Figure 11. Consider Figure 10. Regions D,
C, and A together are monopoly profit and regions A and B together are duopoly
profit. Because duopoly and monopoly profit share region A in common and duopoly
profit is less than monopoly profit, region B must fit into the remaining part of
monopoly profit. This is shown as region C. Region D is the part of monopoly profit
that remains after duopoly profit is subtracted from it. It is called surplus. In Figure
11, regions A and C, which equal duopoly profit, have been split arbitrarily into two
parts to reflect the division of duopoly profit between Brand and Generic. When price
moves from duopoly to monopoly, Brand goes from earning only the profit
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available to producers, and whenever there is a larger pie it may be
divided in such a way that the parties to the smaller pie will all be
made better off. Brand and Generic always find it profitable to agree
to the latest possible entry date, because the greater the delay, the
more monopoly profit can be substituted for duopoly profit and the
greater the surplus that Brand and Generic may split between
themselves. 5 1
A settlement for entry at the latest possible date is only possible,
however, if Brand has some means of sharing with Generic the
surplus it gains from delay. A reverse payment permits Brand to
share the spoils of delay with Generic. Delay increases the
aggregate profits of Generic and Brand, but the increase goes
entirely to Brand. When Brand may make a reverse payment of any
size to Generic, Brand always has the means to share this increase
with Generic in the form of a payment, which guarantees that
Brand can always make it worth Generic's while to agree to
additional delay.
3. The Litigation Baseline
So far I have considered only the consequences of settlement. I
now consider the consequences of litigation. If Brand wins its
challenge to Generic's entry, then entry is at patent expiry and
consumer value is low. If Brand loses, then entry is immediate and
consumer value is high. Unfortunately, I am uncertain which party
will win. I therefore assign a probability to Brand's victory, which is
known as the "strength" of the patent.5 2 I identify as the expected
value of consumers a level of consumer value above that at patent
expiry, reducing the extent to which it is above by an amount
proportional to Brand's probability of winning the litigation. As
patent strength increases, consumer value falls until, if I suppose
that Brand has a 100% chance of winning the litigation, I expect
consumer value to equal that at patent expiry. If I apply this

represented by the small rectangle labeled "Brand" to earning the entire profit
represented by the larger dotted rectangle enclosing all three smaller labeled
rectangles, including the surplus rectangle D. At this high profit level, clearly Brand
can afford to give Generic back its lost share of duopoly profit, retain its own duopoly
profit share, and split the surplus D with Generic to make both parties better off
than under duopoly.

51. This point is emphasized in Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs, supra note
14, at C5.
52. See Shapiro, supra note 14, at 399 ("The probability that the patentholder
wins' will be called 'patent strength."').
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probability to the patent term, I obtain an expected duration of
exclusivity in litigation that increases with the probability of
Brand's success until, at 100% probability, it equals the patent
term. I call this duration the "litigation entry date." 5 3
As the litigation entry date increases, expected consumer value
falls at a constant rate, since both are determined by the same
probability. But consumer value in settlement also falls from its
high to its low value at a constant rate as the settlement entry date
increases. This implies that expected consumer value for a given
litigation entry date is the same as consumer value at a settlement
entry date that is the same as that litigation entry date. A similar
argument establishes that expected Brand and Generic profit in
litigation are the same as Brand and Generic profit for a settlement
entry date equal to the litigation entry date. vset
set and CS in
Figure 12 therefore describe expected value for a given litigation
entry date just as well as they describe value for a given actual
entry date. 54
C. Litigation Costs
1. The Settlement Range
When litigation is costly to Brand and Generic, litigation and
settlement value for a given entry date no longer coincide. The
parties now avoid litigation costs when they settle, driving up
settlement value for each party in the amount of those avoided
litigations costs. For nonzero litigation costs, Brand and Generic's
profit lines in litigation therefore lie below their settlement lines, at
vt
and vset in Figure 12. Litigation costs have no effect, however,
on consumer value because consumers do not pay them, either
directly or indirectly.5 5 Thus CS in Figure 12 continues to describe

53. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at 664 (" [I]f the remaining life of
the patent is 8 years, and the incumbent's probability of winning the litigation is
75%, then the expected date of entry is 75% of the way through those 8 years, or 6
years.").

54. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: PharmaceuticalPatent Settlement
as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1588-89 (2006) [hereinafter
Hemphill, Payingfor Delay] (making the argument in this paragraph).
55.

I am not aware of an acknowledgment of this fact in any other source. The

saving of litigation cost does increase total welfare. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra
note 13, at 680-81 (developing an algebraic expression for total welfare that is
decreasing in litigation costs). But antitrust is concerned with consumer value alone.

See infra note 106.
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consumer value under both litigation and settlement. While Brand
and Generic have litigation cost savings to gain from settlement,5 6
consumers do not.
The range of settlements to which Brand and Generic might
agree includes only those settlements that leave the parties no
worse off than they would find themselves under litigation.57 I
consider first the range when no transfer of value between Brand
and Generic, in either direction, is permitted.
The first settlement that must be in the range is a settlement for
entry at the litigation entry date. Each party gains an amount equal
to their litigation cost avoided from such a settlement, so each is no
worse off under settlement, meeting my criterion for admission to
the range. Settlements that change entry from the litigation entry
date are also possible because the settlement date is a currency that
has value to both parties. An earlier date is worth Generic's share of
duopoly profit to Generic, and a later date is worth the difference
between monopoly profit and Brand's share of duopoly profit to
Brand. So Brand may use early entry relative to the litigation entry
date to reward Generic for settling. Similarly, Generic may use later
entry to reward Brand for settling.
Brand is willing to agree to earlier entry up to the point at
which the extra profit it loses equals its savings in litigation cost.
Similarly, Generic is willing to agree to delay up to the point at
which the profits it loses come to equal its savings on litigation. The
settlement date upon which Brand and Generic may agree may be
early or late relative to the litigation entry date.5 8 This range is
shown in Figure 12 between the points labeled "min" and "max." 59

56.
This is reflected in Figure 12, which shows Brand and Generic's profit lines
under settlement and expected profit lines under litigation. The litigation lines lie
below the profit lines by the amount of each party's litigation cost. If in settlement
the parties agree to entry at the expected litigation date and do not agree to any cash
payment, both are made better off because each moves up at the expected litigation

date from their litigation line to their settlement line.
57. See, e.g., Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at 681 ("The range of viable
outcomes from bargaining is the set that make each party at least as well off as they

would be under litigation. . . .").
58.
THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS,
PROPERTY, AND LITIGATION 158 (1997) ("[A] settlement range always exists given the
higher cost of trials compared to settlements.").
59.
Consider Figure 12. The dotted horizontal line from vt to v"e gives the
earliest entry date, labeled min, for which Brand is at least as well off under
settlement as it would be under litigation. All entry dates above min are preferred by
Brand. Similarly, max gives the latest entry date for which Generic is at least as well
off as under litigation. The range of dates between min and max gives all settlement
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Allowing transfers of value extends the range in both directions.
The availability of a reverse payment extends the maximum delay
in the settlement range. I have observed that Brand gets more from
delay than Generic loses because delay increases the aggregate
profits of both firms. This allows Brand to compensate Generic for
any losses Generic suffers from delay after Generic's litigation cost
savings have been exhausted, and still retain some of the gains for
itself. In principle, the availability of a reverse payment allows
infinite delay because total profits are always increasing in delay in
this model. In practice, courts will not permit an agreement to
delay entry past patent expiry. If antitrust places a cap on the
amount of any reverse payment, then this will also limit the amount
of possible delay because it places an upper bound on the amount of
losses due to delay for which Brand may compensate Generic.
The availability of an obverse payment extends the maximum
hastening in the settlement range. In the absence of an obverse
payment, Brand will only agree to accept a loss from hastening up
to the litigation cost it avoids by settling. An obverse payment from
Generic compensates Brand for losses from additional hastening.
Unlike a reverse payment, an obverse payment has a natural limit.
Brand's losses from hastening must exceed Generic's gains, just as
Brand's gains from delay must exceed Generic's losses. Generic
therefore cannot compensate Brand for hastening unless Generic
dips into its litigation cost savings from settlement in order to do so.
As Generic buys more hastening, these savings are used up, until
eventually Generic can purchase no more hastening.
The settlement range therefore extends from the natural
maximum on hastening up to the maximum delay allowed by any
reverse payment cap and, if none, all the way to patent expiry.60 All

dates that would make Brand and Generic better off and at which consequently they
might settle. Note that this range includes dates after the date of expected entry
under litigation. For these dates consumer value, CS, is lower than under the
expected litigation entry date. For an algebraic development, see Willig & Bigelow,
supra note 13, at 664-65, 681-82.
60. The range may be specified algebraically. Let LB and L0 be Brand and
Generic's litigation costs, respectively. Let MB, DB , and D0 be Brands profit in
monopoly and duopoly and Generic's duopoly profit, respectively. Let IT be the
amount of any payment flowing between Brand and Generic. And let T, E, and P be
the patent term, the period before entry (which I also loosely refer to as the "entry
date"), and the probability that Brand will win the litigation, respectively. See Edlin
et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 620-34 (using this notation). Generic
is not worse off in settlement if (T - E)D0 + iT (1 - P)TD0 - L0 , which rearranges to
7T (PT - E)DG - LG. Obverse payments increase Brand's settlement value and
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reverse payments reduce it. I am interested in all possible settlements, so I want
Brands settlement value to be as large as possible. I therefore want the largest
obverse payment and the smallest reverse payment. Converting the payment
condition to an equality produces this result. So I choose iT to equal (PT - E)D0 - L0
Brand is willing to settle if EMB + (T - E)DB - iT PTMB + (1 - P)TDB - LB. I
subtract iT from Brands settlement value because the flow of payment must be in a
direction opposite to that for Generic. Obverse payments flow out of Generic's pocket
and into Brands, and vice versa for reverse payments. Plugging (PT - E)D0 - L0 for
if into this expression and rearranging, I have E
PT - [ LG+LB ]. For the direction
MB-DG-DB

of the inequality I rely on the fact that monopoly profit must exceed total duopoly
profit, and therefore MB -DG -DB > 0. E PT - [
B]
imposes a lower bound on
MB-DG-DB

E, indicating that there is a maximum limit to the amount of hastening that Generic
may purchase with an obverse payment. Because it places no upper bound on E, it
shows that a reverse payment may buy any amount of delay. Brand is willing to
purchase any amount of delay, but if a cap q
0 is placed on the reverse payment,
Generic will accept an entry date only if it satisfies (T - E)D0 + q
(1 - P)TD0 - LG.
Rearranging, I obtain E PT + [LG+ ]. This gives the upper bound on settlement
DG

delay

under

ILG +LB

a

reverse

payment

cap.

The

settlement

range

is

therefore

LG+q]

IMB-DG-_DB IDG

-

In the multiple generic case, Brand and Generic earn duopoly profits for a fixed
period H after Generic enters, after which additional generics enter the market and
profit for all parties goes to zero. For E < T - H, Generic's settlement value is
constant for all entry dates, so Generic is willing to settle for any date in this range
as long as Generic must not make an obverse payment that reduces settlement value
below litigation value. Generic will therefore settle only if HD0 + IT
(1 - P)HD0
-

L0 , which rearranges to if
-PHD - LG. PHD0 + LG is therefore the greatest obverse
payment Generic will make. Brand is willing to settle over this range if EMB + HDB
if
PTMB + (1 - P)HDB - LB. Substituting -PHD 0 - L 0 for if and rearranging, I have
E > PT - PH rDG+DB]
I

MB

J

MB

, which puts a lower bound on the settlement entry date.

Brand may not always be willing to agree to E

T - H. This can occur if PT is

-

substantially greater than T - H. For E > T - H, Brand settles if EMB + (T - E)DB
if

PTMB + (1 - P)HDB - LB. Substituting -PHD 0 - L 0 for if and rearranging, I have

E

PT

r

MB I -PH

MB-DB

[DG+DB - (T - H)
MB-DB

[

I

DB

MB-DB

LB+LG . If this expression

yields a

MB-DB

bound greater than T - H, then it gives the lower bound. Because only a small range

of PT will give rise to this bound, I will ignore it in what follows.

I have E

PT

- (T - (1 - P)H)

M-DB
MB-DB-DG

BG

B

which imposes no limit on

delay. For

DG
MB-DB-DG

a reverse payment cap q

MB-DB-DG
e
however, I have a settlement condition for Generic of (T -

E)DG + q

! (1 -

0,

P)HDG

-

condition and rearranging,

-

!

Because settlement value is constant over E
T - H, there is no limit on the
delay to which Generic will agree over this range. For E > T - H, Generic is not
worse off in settlement if (T - E)D0 + iT
(1 - P)HDG - L0 , which rearranges to If
[(1 - P)H - (T - E)]DG - LG. Because reverse payments reduce Brands settlement
value, here again I want the smallest reverse payment for a given level of delay to
which Generic will agree. I therefore want the expression for If to hold with equality.
Over this range, Brand is no worse off in settlement if EMB + (T - E)DB - I
PTMB + (1 - P)HDB - LB. Substituting [(1 - P)H - (T - E)]DG - L0 for if into this
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settlements within this range are possible in the sense that they
make neither party worse off than under litigation. Some
settlements may leave one party better off than the other. Brand
and Generic might settle for entry at the litigation entry date with a
payment from Brand to Generic equal to Brand's litigation cost.
Brand does not profit from such a settlement.6 1 Or Generic might
pay its litigation cost avoided to Brand, in which case Generic does
not profit. All settlements that do not make either party worse off
than under litigation are included in the range, regardless of the
distributive outcome.
Some settlements are better than others for Brand and Generic
as a group. Total profit increases with delay, so from the perspective
of the joint interest of Brand and Generic, the best settlement is for
the greatest possible delay. Similarly, the worst settlement from
this perspective is for the greatest possible hastening. The joint
interest of the parties in the greatest possible delay has led some
commentators to describe such a settlement as an "equilibrium."6 2
This must not be understood, however, to suggest that the parties,
even if rational, must always choose the greatest available delay in
settlement or even choose to settle at all. It is an enduring
frustration of economics that it has not been able to explain why,
within a given range of bargains that leave no one worse off, the
parties must choose the bargain that maximizes their joint value
over any other. 63 Each party wants to maximize its individual profit,

L0 , which rearranges to E < T - (1 - P)H +

[PT -PH

r
L MB

J

LG+LB T - (1 -P)H +
-G+DB
MB

DG

G. The settlement range is therefore

]+LG
DGI

61. This is shown in Figure 12. If Brand pays its litigation cost, LB, to Generic,
then its settlement line v"e will shift down to become identical to its litigation line
VB . But Generic's settlement line will rise to v 0 et + LB (not shown). Generic ends up
with a profit if it settles at the litigation entry date, whereas Brand does not.
62. See Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 12, at C5 (criticizing
other commentators for suggesting that Brand and Generic could agree to a reverse
payment settlement that involves no delay because such a non-delay reverse
payment settlement "is simply not an equilibrium outcome in [the standard entry]
model"); Shapiro, supra note 12, at 395 ("[W]ithout limits on patent settlements,
consumers will receive only the surplus available facing a monopolist."). Others have
a similar view. Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent
Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 43 (2004)
(showing that settlements are possible without a reverse payment but observing that
"litigants will always prefer cash payment settlements because such settlements will
eliminate the sharing in the gains of the patent challenge by consumers").
63. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMIcs 77 n.5 (3d ed.
2000) ("Economists have long struggled with the fact that self-interested rationality

2016]

UNCERTAINTYAND

REVERSE PAYMENTS

117

not joint profit, and it is perfectly rational for each to hold out for a
larger share of the value from the best deal, making agreement
impossible and forcing a deal for less value, or none at all. 6 4 Any
deal in the settlement range is possible, whether it minimizes joint
profits by maximizing hastening or maximizes joint profits by
maximizing delay.65
The foregoing shows that settlement may harm consumers even
when no reverse payment is permitted. Delay harms consumers. By
trading delay for the litigation cost savings of settlement, the
parties may harm consumers even when Brand does not share with
Generic via a reverse payment any profits associated specifically
with delay.66 An above-zero cap on reverse payments permits
settlements that allow more delay and therefore more harm.
The range that I define is broader than the range recognized by
other commentators because it includes hastening made possible by

alone does not seem
surplus.").

64.

sufficient to determine

the distribution of the cooperative

See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1982) ("The

parties must haggle over the price until they can agree upon how to distribute the
gains from trade. There is no guarantee that the rational pursuit of self-interest will

permit agreement."). See also infra note 124.
65. The parties do seem to maximize delay in practice. See Hemphill, An
Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 4, at 629, 646, 657-58 (observing, based
on a dataset of 143 settlements from 1984 to 2008, that reverse payment settlements
made prior to the commencement of pressure from antitrust enforcers in the late

1990s, "blocked entry until patent expiration").
66.
This seems the right place to share an observation about the difficulty of
characterizing settlements in antitrust terms. Suppose that a settlement is funded
entirely out of litigation cost savings in the sense that no party gives up more in a
settlement than what she gains as a result of the settlement from the saving of
litigation cost. And suppose further that there is no cash payment between the
parties and that they agree to entry delay as part of the settlement. One would like
to be able to characterize the settlement here as either being anticompetitive in the
sense that it involves a splitting of the surplus associated with more monopoly
pricing or as being procompetitive in the sense that it involves only the splitting of a
surplus derived from some other gain associated with settlement, such as litigation
cost savings.
But such a settlement resists such categorization. It of course hurts consumers
and increases monopoly. But it is not anticompetitive in the sense that it involves a
splitting of the surplus from monopoly because Generic does not share in the surplus.
There is no cash payment from Brand to Generic. It is procompetitive in the sense

that the parties do split the surplus from the avoidance of litigation costs. But it
cannot be said that this is the only surplus that motivates the parties because Brand
enjoys the surplus from increased monopoly as well.
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an obverse payment.6 7 I include such payments because there
appears to be no economic explanation for the possibility of reverse
payments in this model that does not apply equally well to obverse
payments. Brand makes a reverse payment to enjoy some of the
benefit of delay. Generic may do the same in order to obtain the
benefit it enjoys from hastening. Use of a reverse payment allows
the parties to maximize their aggregate value. Use of an obverse
payment allows the parties to minimize their aggregate value. 68
Both these outcomes are possible bargains because they leave the
parties no worse off than they are under litigation. If I admit the
possibility of the best bargain in terms of aggregate profit, I ought
also admit the possibility of the worst.
2. The Litigation Cost Rule
The settlement range I have identified shows that the cap on
reverse payments in excess of litigation cost advocated by some
economists 69 does not amount to a ban on all settlements that harm
consumers. 70 Such a "litigation cost rule" simply places a cap on the
amount of delay and harm that settlement may cause. Moreover,
from the perspective of minimizing consumer harm, the magnitude
of the cap is arbitrary. It is not clear why we should prefer to limit
possible harm to that which can be bought with a payment equal to
litigation cost as opposed to that which can be bought for half as
much. Or for nothing.
The motivation for placing the cap at litigation cost is to ensure
that the rule does not preclude any settlements that benefit
consumers, rather than that it prevent all that could harm them.71

67. See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 621 (modeling only
the possibility of a reverse payment); Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 14, at 298
(doing the same); Willig & Bigelow, supranote 13, at 681 (also doing the same).
68.
This happens when Generic makes the largest possible obverse payment.
The joint value of Brand and Generic falls with hastening because hastening
substitutes duopoly for monopoly. Note 138 shows that a cap on any obverse
payment increases the lower settlement bound. It follows that the largest possible
obverse payment renders the lower bound as low as possible and thereby the joint
value of Brand and Generic as low as possible.

69. See Edlin et al., Actavis and Error Costs, supra note 14, at Cl; Edlin et al.,
supra note 13, at 22; Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 14, at 297; Shapiro, supra note
14, at 407-08.
70. For sources that acknowledge this point, see infra note 134.
71. Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 633 ( [T]he Actavis
Inference with a litigation cost benchmark is favorable to defendants because by
design it minimizes false condemnations without concern for false acquittals."). Cf.

2016]

UNCERTAINTYAND

REVERSE PAYMENTS

119

When Brand makes a payment in excess of litigation cost, Brand
has no litigation cost savings to spend on hastening, and therefore
Brand will insist on at least some delay and therefore on at least
some harm to consumers.72 When Brand makes a payment less than
litigation cost, Brand is still amenable to some hastening.
Skeptics argue that the litigation cost rule fails even to avoid
precluding any beneficial settlements. 73 They point out that the rule
depends on a number of assumptions, including the absence of risk
aversion and asymmetric information, that may not be realistic. 74 If
any assumption fails to hold, then the rule will ban not only some
settlements that harm consumers but also some that help
consumers. Perhaps the most important assumption is that Brand
shares the same expectation as consumers about the entry date
under litigation. If Brand expects an earlier entry date than do
consumers, then allowing Brand to pay a sum in excess of litigation
cost for what it thinks is delay may nevertheless result in what
consumers consider early entry relative to their own different
expectation of what entry would be under litigation.7 5
D. The Case of Multiple Generic Entrants
Another group of skeptics argue76 that the model is unrealistic
because it fails to take into account the 180-day period of exclusivity
granted to the first Generic to challenge the patent.7 7 They argue

Edlin et al., supra note 13, at 22 (emphasizing that all settlements involving a
reverse payment in excess of litigation cost harm consumers); Hemphill, Paying for
Delay, supra note 54, at 1594 ("By differentiating pay-for-delay settlements that
include large cash payments from those with payments that are equal to or less than
saved litigation expense, the safe harbor usefully distinguishes those settlements

likely to inflict the largest allocative harm.").
72.
Consider Figure 12. If Brand makes a payment in excess of its litigation
cost, its settlement line falls down below its litigation line, which means that
settlement makes it worse off than litigation unless the agreed settlement date
exceeds the expected entry date under litigation. The dotted horizontal line
connecting Brands litigation value with Brand's settlement value line must now
extend out from litigation value in a rightward direction. The downward-shifting
settlement line pushes Brands minimum acceptable settlement ("min" in the figure)

up past the litigation entry date ("expected entry" in the figure).
73. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 83; Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at
677-81.
74. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 15, at 85-87.
75. See generally Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at 692-96. Cf. Schildkraut,
supra note 15, at 1063-64 (discussing "misplaced optimism" of Generic).
76. Kobayashi et al., supra note 16, at 91.
77. See supra note 34.
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that after the 180 days run out, generics will flood the market and
drive price to competitive levels, so it is unreasonable to assume
that duopoly will persist from entry all the way until patent
expiry.78 Recall that a model that takes account of competitive
pricing after expiration of the 180-day period is a "multiple entry"
model; one that does not is a "single entry" model. I now outline the
setup of the multiple entry model, consider its effect on the
settlement range, and describe how the skeptics use it to attack the
litigation cost rule.
The 180-day exclusivity period applies regardless whether the
first filer enters by winning or settling litigation. 79 For settlement
entry dates up to 180 days before patent expiry, the expiration of
the 180-day exclusivity period allows consumers to enjoy the greater
consumer value, and Brand to suffer the lesser private value,
associated with competitive pricing before patent expiry, at least for
a short period. This gives consumers more to lose from delay, and
Brand more to gain, than if duopoly were to extend until patent
expiry. Delay reduces the period of competition prior to patent
expiry until, 180 days before patent expiry, there is no pre-expiry
period of competition at all. Thereafter, delay reduces only the
period of duopoly, just as it does in the single entry model. Thus, in
moving from the single to multiple entry models, consumer value
kinks upward, and Brand's downward, at 180 days before patent
expiry, as shown in Figure 13.80

78. Kobayashi et al., supra note 16, at 89.
79. Kobayashi et al. consider a slightly different case in which first-filer
exclusivity followed by competitive pricing applies to entry through litigation but not
to entry through settlement. See id. at 92. The basis for this distinction is that Brand
must lose on patent validity in litigation before it can be estopped from asserting its
patent against subsequent entrants. See Blonder Tongue v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402

U.S. 313, 330-34 (1971) (holding that a patent that has been found invalid in an
action against one defendant may not be asserted against subsequent defendants);

Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 607. Thus when Generic enters
as part of a litigated outcome, as opposed to settlement, Brand will often be
powerless to challenge additional generic entrants once the 180-day first-filer period
expires. A settlement prevents the courts from reaching a final judgment against
Brand, allowing Brand to sue any additional generics that may wish to enter after
the first-filer's exclusivity period has run out. If Brand vigorously defends its patent
after settlement, the first-filer that settles may enjoy a duopoly until the expiration

of the patent.
80.
The figure shows consumer (CS), Brand (VB), and Generic value (vG) in the
multiple entry case with zero litigation cost. For each party, the kinked line is the
settlement value line and the straight line is the litigation value line.
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Expectations in litigation smooth value from pre-patent-expiry
competition over the entire domain of entry dates, including those
within 180 days of patent expiry, for which in settlement there is no
pre-patent-expiry competition. This lifts litigation value above
settlement value for consumers and drives it below settlement value
for Brand, with the result that for any given entry date consumers
are better off in litigation and Brand worse off. This effect is due to
the prospect of pre-patent-expiry competition,8 1 and not to litigation
costs, so it holds even if there are no litigation costs. The straight
lines in Figure 13 show litigation value when there is no litigation
cost.
Switching to a multiple entry model has an ambiguous effect on
maximum hastening. High litigation costs for Brand and Generic
will tend to result in a lower hastening maximum relative to single
entry and large monopoly profits for Brand will tend to result in a
higher maximum. 8 2 For large patent strengths, maximum hastening
increases. A multiple entry model results in a higher maximum
delay for a given reverse payment cap. 83 Because the multiple entry
model also renders consumers better off under litigation for any
given date of entry, the avoidance of harm to consumers under it
requires not just the absence of delay but a hastening of entry. This
makes the increase in maximum delay of particular concern.
Because in multiple entry Brand is worse off in litigation
regardless of litigation costs, Brand is willing to agree to some
hastening of entry in exchange for settlement, even if litigation costs
are zero. When litigation costs exist, Brand is willing to agree to
additional hastening. It follows that when Brand makes a reverse
payment equal to litigation cost Brand eliminates the part of its
willingness to hasten entry that is attributable to the litigation cost,

81. See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 623 n.111
(explaining the effect).
82.

From note 60, the settlement range is [ML G B
B-DG-DB

case and [PH

D

-DB

MB

, T - (1 - P)H +

MLGIIB+BDG

G]
DG

in the single entry

]+LG]
in the multiple entry case.

It

follows from a comparison of the lower bounds that the lower bound in the multiple
entry case is less than the lower bound in the single entry case if
LB+LG

MB-DB-DG
MB

. The effect on the lower bound of switching from
a single entry to a

PH(DB+DG)-(LB+LG)

multiple entry model is ambiguous; it depends on patent strength P, for example.

The capped upper bound is higher in multiple than in single entry. Subtracting the
single entry upper bound from the multiple entry upper bound, I have T - (1 - P)H,

which is positive if T > H, a condition that must hold.
83. See supra note 82.
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but not the part that is attributable to the smoothing in litigation of
the effects of pre-patent-expiry competition. Thus a payment in
excess of litigation cost might still result in a hastening of entry.
Litigation cost rule skeptics might rely on this observation to
argue that a litigation cost rule prohibits some reverse payment
settlements that benefit consumers. 84 The litigation cost advocates
may counter by observing that in a multiple entry model consumers
are better off in litigation and it follows that hastening is required
for avoidance of harm to consumers. A litigation cost rule that
denies Brand some settlements that hasten entry does not preclude
some beneficial settlements unless the hastening required for
consumers to benefit is less than the hastening denied by the
litigation cost rule. If the hastening required for consumers to
benefit is greater, then having some payments for which Brand is
willing to hasten cannot preclude beneficial settlements because
that hastening could not make consumers better off relative to
litigation anyway.8 5 The litigation cost advocates argue that
estimates of monopoly, duopoly, and competitive values in the drug
market suggest that the hastening required for consumer benefit
tends to be greater than that allowed by Brand due to value

84.
The argument might be understood graphically in Figure 13 as follows.
When Brand makes a payment equal to its litigation cost, it shifts its settlement
value line to the position it would have in relation to its litigation value line if its
litigation costs were zero. Figure 13, which shows value in the absence of litigation
costs, may therefore be used to consider Brand's choices when it makes a payment
equal to, but not in excess of, its litigation costs. The intersection of the horizontal
dashed line with Brands settlement value gives the earliest entry date to which
Brand is willing to agree. Because this intersection point falls earlier than the point
of intersection of the horizontal dashed line with consumer value, which latter gives
the latest entry date for which consumers are not harmed, it is clear that Brand may
agree to a settlement that does not harm consumers. The space between these two
intersection points gives the range of settlements involving payments in excess of
litigation cost to which Brand may agree and that benefit consumers.

85.

Consider Figure 13. A payment equal to litigation cost will result in the

settlement and litigation value lines for Brand depicted in the graph. If the slopes of
these lines are agreeable, and the litigation cost advocates argue that they are, then
the greatest hastening tolerated by Brand cannot leave consumers better off. This
happens when the intersection of the horizontal dashed line with Brands settlement
value line falls after the intersection of the horizontal dashed line with consumer
settlement value (this case is not shown in the figure). If the slopes of Brand's value
lines allow this for a payment equal to litigation cost, then they will also allow it for
payments in excess of litigation cost, because such payments push Brands
settlement value line downward, driving Brands earliest entry date even higher.
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smoothing, and therefore a litigation cost rule does not prohibit
settlements that benefit consumers.8 6
II. THE LIMITS OF THE POLICY IN FAVOR OF SETTLEMENT
Having outlined the standard entry model, I now pause to use it
to reject a common explanation of the reverse payments problem. It
is sometimes said that the root of the reverse payments problem is
that consumers have an interest in the outcome of patent litigation
but do not have their interest represented in the dispute between
Brand and Generic. 87 Settlement is justified if the interests of the
parties to a dispute generally exhaust the interests balanced by the
law that is the subject of the dispute. When this is so, the outcome
of settlement can be expected to approximate the outcome of
litigation, but save the parties the higher cost of litigation.
According to the common account, banning reverse payments brings
the interest of Generic into alignment with that of consumers,
giving the consumer interest a proxy in any settlement
negotiation.8 8 Once a ban on reverse payments is in place, a policy of
allowing settlements is therefore appropriate.
The settlement range defined in Part I.C.1 shows that a reverse
payment ban fails to bring the interests of Generic and consumers
into alignment. The average settlement under a reverse payment
ban may involve delay. This calls into question the wisdom of
extending the judicial policy in favor of settlement of disputes to the
patent context. 8 9
I proceed by first giving a summary of the
rationale for a policy in favor of settlement and then turning to its
limitations in the drug patent context.

86.

See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 627-28. A

perplexing development in the debate between the skeptics and the advocates of the
litigation cost rule is the argument of the skeptics that the rule should be avoided
because in a multiple entry model the entire settlement range may involve harm to

consumers. See Kobayashi et al., supra note 16, at 92-93 ("all feasible settlements,
including those in which there is no reverse payment, generate consumer welfare
that is lower than the expected welfare net of litigation costs that would be produced
through litigation."). To the extent that the skeptics advocate laissez faire as an

alternative to a litigation cost rule, see id. at 95 (suggesting that the "scope of the
patent" test might be appropriate), this hardly helps their case. It is consistent with
advocacy of a rule of reason, however. See supra note 15.
87.
Davis, supra note 10, at 262 ("Reverse payments . . . threaten to drive a
wedge between the interests of generic manufacturers and purchasers.").

88.
89.

See id. at 261.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (recognizing "a general legal policy favoring the

settlement of disputes").
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A. The Rationale for a Policy in Favor of Settlement
From the perspective of the government, the reason to support
settlement of disputes is that the parties to a settlement will
negotiate approximately the result that the government wishes to
obtain, but at a fraction of the cost because formalities are
avoided. 90 The further that the settlement result deviates from the
result desired by the government, the greater the extent to which
the litigation cost savings of settlement are offset by the costs of an
inaccurate result from the perspective of the government. 9 1
In the entry settlement context this means that the further that
the entry date agreed in settlement delays entry relative to the
litigation entry date, the greater the extent to which the litigation
cost savings associated with settlement are offset by the harm
inflicted on consumers. Because consumers do not pay litigation
costs, they are not affected by them in this model. As a result, there
is no advantage to be had from settlement under a consumer
welfare standard and nothing to balance out the harm associated
with a settlement for delay. Thus in the entry settlement context no
inaccuracy in settlement may be tolerated. Any amount of delay
results in a net harm.
Whether settlement will approximate the litigated result is
therefore an important criterion in determining whether the
government should promote or ban settlements. 92 I may think of the
law that underlies a given dispute as representing a balancing of
competing interests. In general, if all the interests balanced by the
law are party to the dispute, then the government can expect that

90. In other words, settlement is desirable where error costs are small and the
transaction costs associated with litigation are high relative to those associated with
settlement. Cf id. at 272 ("From an economic perspective, two concerns in dispute
resolution are primary: error costs and transaction costs.").
91.

Cf STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 451,

454 (2004) ( [T]he level of accuracy that maximizes social welfare will reflect a
compromise between the value of increasing accuracy and the cost of achieving it.").
Most standard discussions of the tradeoff between accuracy and enforcement cost,
such as the one just cited, focus on the cost of making courts better able to accurately
apply the law. The issue in this article is the cost associated with moving from a
settlement regime to a litigation regime in order to eliminate inaccuracies associated
with settlement. Steven Shavell hints at this issue when he observes that [o]ne
wonders . . . about the wisdom of promoting settlement, let alone allowing it, in
situations in which deterrence is likely to be compromised' by the confidentiality of
settlements. Id. at 415.
92. Cf Davis, supra note 10, at 288 (" [S]ettlement for the expected value of
litigation produces the same error costs, on average, as a trial on the merits.").
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the settlement outcome will approximate the outcome that would be
obtained under litigation. 93 This is because each interest underlying
the law will have a champion in settlement negotiations, and the
relative weight placed by the law on each interest will give each
champion relative bargaining power in settlement that will cause
the balance of interests in settlement to approximate the balance of
interests in the law. 9 4

For example, suppose that Company A contracts to buy ten
widgets from Company B, but rejects the delivery because it
believes that the widgets are defective. 95 Suppose that if it were to
examine the case the government would determine that the widgets
are of high quality and Company A should pay. Company A has an
interest in not paying (perhaps it does not need the widgets
anymore) but Company B has an interest in demanding payment.
Given the legal requirement that a party must pay if quality is
delivered, 96 Company B's interests will have the greater negotiating
power and the result of the settlement will be something like a
requirement that Company B be paid.
B. There Should Be No Policy in Favor of Patent Settlement
The government cannot expect that settlement will approximate
litigation, however, where some interests underlying the law are not
represented at the bargaining table during settlement. If, in my
example, Company A could somehow settle the case in the absence
of Company B (indulge the fantasy of a unilateral settlement), then
of course the government could not assume that the correct result
from its perspective would be reached. Company A would simply
settle for nonpayment. This is possible because Company B's

93. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 63, at 400 (observing that when the
expectations of the parties are identical and they face the same litigation costs, then
a "reasonable" settlement will "equal[] the expected judgment at trial").
94. The litigation entry date reflects the government's desired resolution of the
case. As shown in Figure 12, the location of the expected litigation entry date
(marked "expected entry" in the figure) determines the maximum amount of delay to
which Generic will agree. That maximum date ensures that Generic will have at
least enough bargaining power in any settlement to enter at that maximum and no
later. If the expected litigation entry date moves earlier, then Generic's maximum
settlement entry date will also move earlier, reflecting the stronger bargaining
position dealt to Generic by the more favorable underlying law.
95. U.C.C. § 2-602(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).

96.

U.C.C. §§ 2-708, 2-709 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2015).
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interests would not be represented at the bargaining table. 97
Company B cannot refuse to settle if the agreement does not
approximate what it would obtain under litigation because
Company B is not at the table. In such a case, the government
cannot promote settlement as an alternative to litigation. 98
Both producers and consumers are interested in the terms of the
exclusivity granted by patent law because higher prices and profits
can mean less value for consumers. 99 In general, because consumers
are not a party to patent settlements between producers,
government cannot expect patent settlements to approximate
judicial outcomes and therefore no policy in favor of settlement is
justified in the patent context. 100 On the contrary, government must
expect that any settlement will deviate substantially from the

97. Cf Davis, supra note 10, at 265 ("A, B, and C each claim an individual
ownership right in fee simple absolute to Blackacre. A and B then agree to settle
their claims against one another by splitting the property between them. If C filed a
lawsuit seeking to establish her ownership, it would be extraordinary to suggest that
the settlement between A and B would extinguish her rights.").
98. Cf. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212 (" [T]he antitrust laws could be read to
outlaw all, or nearly all, settlements of Hatch-Waxman infringement actions. Patent
holders would be required to litigate each threatened patent to final, unappealable
judgment. Only patents that the courts held were valid would be entitled to confer
monopoly power on their proprietors. But such a requirement would be contrary to
well-established principles of law. [S]ettlement of patent litigation is not only
suffered, it is encouraged for a variety of reasons even if it leads in some cases to the
survival of monopolies created by what would otherwise be fatally weak patents. It is
too late in the journey for us to alter course.").
99. Of course, the mere fact that consumers have an interest in patent law does
not imply that the government should care about that interest and therefore wish
that settlement outcomes do it justice. Joshua Davis appears to argue that the
interests of consumers enter the law through antitrust. See Davis, supra note 10, at
265 (" [D]rug purchasers have a right to prevent brand and generic drug
manufacturers from agreeing not to compete . . . ."). But I need not stray so far from
patent law in order to find the entrance. The existence of a limited patent term, 35
U.S.C. § 154 (20 years), shows that Congress balanced the interests of consumers
against those of producers in fashioning patent law. But see William F. Baxter, Legal

Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE
L.J. 267, 270-71 (1966) (failing to mention consumer value in listing reasons to limit
the amount of subsidy for invention conferred by the patent regime).
100. Cf Davis, supra note 10, at 264-65 ("What is special-although by no
means unique-about patent rights is that they determine the legal entitlements not
only of drug manufacturers, but also of drug purchasers . . . . [It is] extraordinary to
treat a settlement between drug manufacturers as eliminating the right of drug
purchasers under the antitrust laws to a market free from collusion."); Owens, supra
note 15, at 1393 ("In patent settlements, the incentives of the parties are aligned
against a large, unrepresented constituency - consumers. . . .").
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outcome that it desires and therefore it must be vigilant in
supervising settlements, if it permits them at all.
C. A Ban on Reverse Payments Does Not Necessarily Align the

Interests of Generic and Consumers
Under a ban on reverse payments, it might appear that the
interests of consumers and Generic fall into alignment, and
therefore Generic may be relied upon to negotiate settlements that
protect the interests of consumers. 101 Without a reverse payment,
Brand cannot share with Generic the value Brand takes from
consumers through delay, so delay harms Generic as well as
consumers. 102 But, despite the shared preference of Generic and
consumers for hastening, Generic may still settle for delay that
harms consumers. The interests of Generic and consumers are
aligned only in the sense that a hastening in settlement entry
makes both better off.10 3 Alignment here does not mean, however,
that any settlement that makes Generic better off must also make
consumers better off. Generic may be willing to agree to a
settlement that consumers would never be willing to agree to if they
were at the bargaining table. As described in Part I.B.1, any amount
of delay harms consumers. Indeed, in the multiple entry case even
some hastening harms consumers. 104 But I show in Part I.C.1 that
in order to save on litigation costs Generic is willing to agree to
some amount of delay in both single and multiple entry, even in the
absence of a reverse payment. 105
III. PROTECTING CONSUMERS MEANS GUARANTEEING No HARM

I now come to the main argument of this article. In this Part, I
argue that the mission of antitrust to prevent harm to consumers
requires that it adopt a rule that guarantees no harm to consumers.

101. See Davis, supra note 10, at 261 ("The key is to align the interests of generic
drug manufacturers and drug purchasers. That can be done by banning reverse
payments as per se illegal.").
102. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
103. See Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust, supra note 4, at 652-53
("Ordinarily, late entry dates are bad for consumers, but also bad for the alleged
infringer, whose profits are a function of the amount of time on the market, and who
therefore can be expected to fight for an earlier entry date.").
104. See supra Part I.D.
105. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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I argue that in the standard entry model such a rule must
guarantee that firms cannot settle for delay.
A. The ProtectionStandard
The prevailing antitrust consumer value standard demands that
antitrust prevent harm to consumers. 106 Antitrust economists
operationalize it by supplying consumer value in litigation as the
baseline against which to measure consumer harm in the patent
settlement context. Accordingly, they appear to agree that the role
of antitrust is to ban settlements that reduce consumer value
relative to the value that consumers would receive under
litigation. 10 7

106. See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
191, 196 (2008) ("The antitrust laws . . . can be explained as a congressional
declaration that the property right we today call 'consumers' surplus' belongs to
consumers . . . . [T]he antitrust laws primarily were enacted to award this property
right to purchasers of goods and services, and to prevent cartels and unjustified
monopolies from taking it. The ultimate objective of these laws, in short, is to protect
consumers, not to increase overall efficiency."); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is

the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer
Welfare Standard, 22 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2009); Shapiro, supra note 14, at

&

396 ("Antitrust enforcement . . often uses a consumer-welfare standard rather than
a total-surplus standard."). But see Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's
Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 570-77 (2012) (arguing that maximizing consumer
welfare has never been the sole recognized policy of antitrust).
107. See Davis, supra note 10, at 263-65 (treating protection of the interest of
"drug purchasers" as the purpose of antitrust policy); Elhauge & Krueger, supra note
14, at 296 (arguing that "a settlement is anticompetitive" if "the settlement
harms . . . ex post consumer welfare" and noting that such harm tends to also result
in harm to ex ante consumer welfare); Shapiro, supra note 14, at 395-97; Willig
Bigelow, supra note 13, at 678 (describing the "significant postponement of
competition" as a necessary condition for antitrust concern"); cf Hemphill, Paying
for Delay, supra note 54, at 1616 (claiming his "analysis offers industry-specific
support for the proposition that pharmaceutical consumers do indeed have an
entitlement to the average level of competition implied by litigation[.]" (emphasis in
original)); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 14, at 1727 n.23 (characterizing the Shapiro
rule as "the right basic inquiry" but adding that [s]ocial rather than merely
consumer surplus may also be the right metric").
Carl Shapiro, has, however, recently joined coauthors in suggesting that the
baseline should be consumer welfare under the best possible settlement. See Aaron
Edlin et al. The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 609 ("Injuring consumers
compared with [value under litigation] is not required to violate the antitrust laws,
given that consumers are injured with respect to a reasonable alternative settlement
. . . ."). I argue below that such a standard is inappropriate under a static model in
the patent context.
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In order to apply this "protection standard," antitrust must
know something about the outcome of litigation between Brand and
Generic. Otherwise, it cannot determine the baseline level of
consumer value against which to evaluate settlement. 108 But in
order to apply the protection standard, antitrust must also know
something about the entry date that the parties will actually choose
in settlement; otherwise, it is impossible to determine whether
consumer value in settlement falls below consumer value in
litigation.
B. The Uncertainty Corollary
There are three levels of knowledge regarding the settlement
entry date: certainty, risk, and uncertainty. In practice, uncertainty
prevails. The proper way to handle it is to impose rules on entry
settlements that make it impossible for them to harm consumers.
If the settlement entry date is known with certainty, consumer
value in settlement may easily be predicted, and a comparison with
litigation value may be made. In the absence of certainty, antitrust
may determine the probability distribution of the settlement entry
date and use it to determine the average effect of settlement on
consumers. Here the settlement entry date is, in a sense, known,
but subject to a measurable risk of inaccuracy. In this case, the
protection standard becomes the command to ensure that on
average settlement does not harm consumers, where the average
may be adjusted, perhaps, for risk aversion.109 I call this variant of
the protection standard the "expected protection standard."
This strategy breaks down, however, in the absence of
information about the probability distribution of the settlement
entry date. If I do not know this probability distribution, then I
cannot determine the average settlement or whether it harms
consumers. This is a situation of uncertainty or ambiguity as
opposed to one of risk. 110

108. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 14, at 397 (" [T]ypically, to compare consumer
surplus under a settlement with consumer surplus from ongoing litigation requires
an informed judgment as to the strength of the patent[s] at issue.").
109. See MARTIN PETERSON, AN INTRODUCTION To DECISION THEORY 64-65
(2009) (describing a consensus in the literature that when the probabilities of
outcomes are known, decisions should maximize expected, or average, value).
110. See id. at 40, 64 (distinguishing decision under "ignorance" from that under
risk).
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Although the decision theory literature contains no consensus
about the way to make a decision under uncertainty,11 1 there is
broad agreement that if a dominant strategy is available, it should
be chosen. 112 A dominant strategy under uncertainty is one for
which all the possible outcomes are either to be preferred to those
under other strategies or are no worse than those under other
strategies. 113 Because under a dominant strategy I am always at
least as well off as under other strategies, regardless of what
happens, I do not need to know the probability of any particular
outcome in order to prefer this strategy. Knowledge of the
probability distribution is not required.
A dominant strategy for responding to uncertainty about the
entry date under settlement is to impose a rule that ensures that
there are no possible entry dates under settlement that harm
consumers. Such a strategy guarantees no harm to consumers
regardless which entry date the parties choose in settlement and is
therefore to be preferred despite uncertainty about which
settlements the parties will choose. In the standard entry model, it
is a rule that makes it impossible for the parties to settle for delay.
I define the "uncertainty corollary" to the protection standard to
be the requirement that in the face of uncertainty about consumer
value in settlement antitrust must adopt a rule that guarantees no
possibility of consumer harm. 114 Because a ban on settlement

111. See id. at 65 ("[T]here is virtually no agreement on how to make decisions
under ignorance.").
112. See id. at 41 ("The widely accepted dominance principle prescribes that
dominated acts must not be chosen." (emphasis in original)).
113. This defines strong dominance. See id. at 42. For recent attention to the
concept of dominance in antitrust scholarship, see C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive
Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 943-44 (2016) ("If one action,
compared to another, has greater or equal benefit and also imposes a lesser burden
on competition, it is decisively better. Such alternatives offer a free lunch that we
may choose without regret. These are the easy cases, in which cost-benefit analysis
can be performed without needing to explore any tradeoff.").
114. The detractors of the litigation cost rule have argued in effect for the
opposite: that any regulatory regime that might preclude a gain to consumers should
be avoided. See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 87 (arguing against a presumption
against reverse payment settlements in excess of litigation cost on the ground that
"the [litigation cost] standard proposed by [Edlin et al.] would condemn some
procompetitive settlements"); Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at 678 ("The principal
lesson of this article is that it could be quite typically [and perhaps dramatically]
socially counterproductive to employ a per se rule against agreements to settle
patent litigation that entail net consideration paid by a patent holder to a potential
entrant."); Schildkraut, supra note 15, at 1067 (Reverse payment settlements "should
not be condemned out of hand . . . because such settlements are not necessarily
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guarantees that firms will always litigate and thereby achieve
litigation value for consumers, a ban on settlement guarantees no
harm to consumers relative to the litigation value baseline imposed
by the protection standard and therefore always satisfies the
uncertainty corollary. I discuss it and other policy options that
satisfy the uncertainty corollary in Part V.
C. The Current Approach to Entry Settlements and Uncertainty
The current approach of antitrust to entry settlements is to
embrace the expected protection standard and ignore the absence of
consensus on the appropriate probability distribution to use in
determining the average settlement. An embrace of the expected
protection standard explains the focus of both sides of the debate
over reverse payment settlements on ensuring that the litigation
cost rule not ban any beneficial settlements. 11 5 Not banning any
beneficial settlements, even at the cost of allowing some harmful
ones, as the litigation cost rule would do, could be an effective
strategy for shifting the mean settlement out of the range of delay
and up to the litigation entry date. Its success depends, however, on
the probability distribution of settlement entry dates after the rule
is applied.
The approach of many of the advocates of the litigation cost rule
to the problem of choosing a probability distribution for the
settlement entry date reflects the spirit of avoidance that
characterizes the current approach of antitrust to the problem.
These advocates of the litigation cost rule have been careful to treat
the outcome under litigation as uncertain in their model. 116 But
they have, for the most part, not incorporated uncertainty regarding
the settlement entry date into their model. They have modeled the
range of dates that a settlement involving a reverse payment in
excess of litigation cost must choose. 117 They also suggest that in the
absence of regulation of reverse payment settlements, the parties

anticompetitive . . . . Reverse payments may in fact accelerate entry and there is no
shortcut to make that determination.").
115. See supra notes 14 & 15, and accompanying text; Aaron Edlin et al., The
Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 627 (in which the litigation cost rule advocates
seek to show that settlements involving payments in excess of litigation cost do not
benefit consumers).
116. See, e.g., Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 620 (assigning
a probability to Brand's success in litigation).
117. Id. at 631-34.

132

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.99

will always choose the greatest possible delay, meaning the
maximum entry date in the settlement range, presumably because
this maximizes joint profit. I critique this approach in Part I.C.1.118
But these advocates of the litigation cost rule provide little
account of the entry date that will be chosen in settlement after
their rule is applied and settlements in excess of litigation cost are
banned. Because settlements without a reverse payment can harm
consumers, whether settling parties will actually choose such
settlements after a reverse payment ban is in place determines
whether a reverse payment ban meets the protection standard.
Without modelling settlement dates, it is therefore impossible for
the litigation cost rule advocates to argue that their rule meets the
protection standard. 119
Those scholars who have grappled with the problem of
uncertainty regarding the entry date in settlement have ignored the
existence of a dominant strategy and have instead tried to appeal to
the principle of insufficient reason to identify an average
settlement. 120 The principle of insufficient reason holds that in the
absence of information about probabilities it is appropriate to
assume that all possible outcomes are equally likely. 121 This
approach has justly been condemned as arbitrary. 122 But even if I
embrace it, there is no reason to appeal to it when a dominant
strategy is available. Other scholars have used the Nash Bargaining
Solution to predict settlement terms. It often yields a result close to

118.

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

119.
These litigation cost rule advocates have recognized the vulnerability of
their position arising from the existence of a settlement range that includes

beneficial settlements. Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 614
("[T]he question is not whether feasible settlements that would improve welfare are
prevented by the [litigation cost rule]. The question is whether desirable settlements
that would actually be chosen in equilibrium are prevented by the [litigation cost

rule].").
120.

Elhauge & Krueger have taken this approach. See supra note 14, at 313-23

("Given that any settlement between Tmin and Tmax is possible, it makes some
sense to assume that all such settlements are equally likely. Under this assumption,
the middle of this settlement range equals the average expected settlement exclusion

period[.]").
121. See PETERSON, supra note 113, at 53 ("The principle of insufficient reason
prescribes that if one has no reason to think that one state of the world is more

probable than another, then all states should be assigned equal probability."
(emphasis in original)).
122. See id. at 55 ( [T]he problem is that it seems completely arbitrary to infer
that all states are equally probable. Any other distribution of probabilities seems to

be equally justified (that is, not at all)." (emphasis in original)).
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that produced by the principle of insufficient reason. 123 While this
solution has many nice properties, necessity is not one of them. 124
D. Rejecting a Maximization Standard in the Patent Context
A crucial assumption underpinning the uncertainty corollary is
that in the patent context antitrust is not interested in increasing or
maximizing consumer value, but only in preventing harm, which in
the standard entry model means preventing any delay in entry
relative to the litigation entry date. If antitrust were interested in
maximizing consumer value, rather than just preventing its
reduction, then it would allow only settlements that provide for
entry as early as possible, because consumer value is decreasing in
the entry date in the standard entry model. 125 Such a "maximization
standard" would allow only the maximum possible hastening of
entry.
Not all guarantees against harm maximize hastening, so under
a maximization standard a guarantee against harm is not a
dominant strategy. A settlement ban always fails to guarantee
maximum hastening, for example, unless the litigation entry date
happens to be the earliest possible entry date. All dominant
strategies under a maximization standard also guarantee against
harm, however, because a strategy that can only maximize
consumer value cannot harm consumers relative to any baseline.
In the standard entry model, any dominant strategy under a
maximization standard must effectively invalidate all patents,
because patents tend to prevent immediate entry. 126 Under a

123.

Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at 665 (using the Nash bargaining

solution).
124.
The Nash Bargaining Solution must be the one chosen by the parties only if

four axioms hold. See PETERSON,

supra note 113, at 249-50. One of these, the

symmetry axiom, assumes that the parties have equal bargaining power. See John F.

Nash, The BargainingProblem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155, 159 (1950) (" [The symmetry
assumption] expresses equality of bargaining skill."). There is no reason to suppose

that this axiom is realistic. See John Thrasher, Uniqueness and Symmetry in
Bargaining Theories of Justice, 167 PHIL. STUD. 683, 684 (2014) (" [S]ymmetry is a
substantive normative constraint that is added into the bargaining procedure, not an
implication of standard accounts of rational choice. Introducing such a substantive
constraint into the bargaining problem effectively begs the question in favor of some
solutions-assuming at the outset what these bargaining theories are attempting to
prove.").

125.
126.

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Shapiro, supra note 14, at 396 (" [D]eclaring all extant intellectual

property rights invalid could well maximize short-run consumer surplus[.]").
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maximization standard, antitrust therefore swallows patent law. I
may not want to avoid this result, but if I do, and I want to for
purposes of this article, then I must either reject a maximization
standard or I must reject the standard entry model's
characterization of consumer value as always decreasing in the
entry date. I consider the latter option in another work. 127 For
purposes of this article, I choose the former option. In doing so,
however, I do not mean to recommend that the maximization of
consumer value never be the goal of antitrust. Indeed, in general, it
should be antitrust's goal.
Instead, I reject a maximization standard because the patent
context is special. It is appropriate for antitrust to regard patent
law as having responsibility for maximizing consumer value
through the regulation of returns to innovation. Antitrust must
therefore treat consumer value that results from litigation of the
patent laws as the maximum possible consumer value, even when it
knows that in fact greater consumer value is possible. Otherwise it
usurps patent's authority to maximize consumer value in this area.
This is a question of institutional deference. 128 In other domains,
such as mergers, antitrust has primary responsibility for
maximizing consumer value and it is appropriate for it to care
whether a given regulation makes consumers worse off not just in
comparison to the status quo but in comparison to the heights that
consumers can reach. 129

127. See Ramsi A. Woodcock, Innovation and Reverse Payments, 43 F.S.U. L.
Rev. _ (forthcoming 2017); cf. Shapiro, supra note 14, at 396 (observing that
accepting the implication of the standard entry model that consumer value is
maximized when patent protection is eliminated would come at the "obvious expense
of longer-term innovation and consumer interests").

128.

See Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 14, at 295 (" [I]t is best to assume that

substantive patent law is optimal. Although scholars sometimes argue that current
patent law upholds too many patents, or too few, some balance must be struck. Even
if one believes that current patent law does not strike the correct balance, the correct
solution is to reform patent law, not to allow courts in antitrust cases to second-guess

patent law doctrine and try to offset it imperfectly . . . ."); Shapiro, supra note 14, at
396 (observing that "taken to an extreme [a maximization] approach would not in
fact respect intellectual property rights" (emphasis in original)).
129. Accordingly, when, outside of the patent settlement context, antitrust
applies a rule of reason, it quite appropriately implements a maximization standard
by imposing a requirement that defendant show that there is no "less restrictive
alternative" to its behavior. See, e.g., 7 HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP & PHILLIP AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶
1505 (3d ed. 2010). A less restrictive alternative is one that results in greater
consumer value. It is to this standard that Edlin et al. mistakenly suggest that
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE UNCERTAINTY COROLLARY To DRUG PATENT
ENTRY SETTLEMENTS

In this Part, I argue that the uncertainty corollary applies to
entry settlements because antitrust has not reached a consensus
regarding what probability distributions to use to describe
settlement entry dates under any proposed rule. I then show that
the two policy options advocated by the parties to the reverse
payments debate, laissez faire and some form of reverse payment
cap, both fail the demand of the uncertainty corollary for a
guarantee against harm. I also consider some additional difficulties
that arise from the application of the principle of insufficient reason.
In the next Part, I consider three rules that do satisfy the
uncertainty corollary: a settlement ban, a rule of reason, and an
obverse payment rule.
A. The UncertaintyCorollaryApplies
I adopt the premise that there is no data on settlements that
might allow me to assign a probability distribution to the settlement
dates made available under any particular settlement rule. I do not
wish to argue that there is in fact no data, however. There is data
available on the settlements chosen by firms under laissez faire, for
example; it suggests that the parties tend to settle for the greatest
possible delay. 130 My reason for adopting the premise is that some
parties to the debate seem to believe that settlements for hastening
are probable enough that a failure to preserve them will cause
average settlements to involve delay and therefore to harm
consumers. 131 There is therefore no consensus on the probability
distribution to employ in determining the average settlement. It
seems more likely that the factions may be induced to agree that the
distribution is uncertain than on any particular distribution. It is
therefore useful to consider what consequences uncertainty has for
policy. I therefore apply the uncertainty corollary as a rhetorical
matter without conceding that there is really insufficient

patent settlements ought to be tied. See Edlin et al., supra note 14, The Actavis

Inference, at 609 & n. 76; supra note 107.
130. See supra note 65. This may explain the desire of some advocates of the
litigation cost rule to assume that the parties always settle for the greatest possible
delay. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
131. Cf. supra note 114 (giving references in which the detractors argue that a
regulatory regime that precludes gains to consumers should be avoided).
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information to identify a distribution. I now turn to consideration of
whether laissez faire or a reverse payment cap satisfies the
uncertainty corollary.
B. Laissez FaireAllows Consumer Harm
I have shown that if there is no reverse payment cap, Brand can
always pay Generic for delay until patent expiry. 132 The rationale
for rejection of laissez faire and embrace of regulation of patent
settlements follows immediately. Under laissez faire, the high point
of the settlement range is patent expiry, which involves delay, and
therefore consumer harm, relative to any other litigation entry date.
Thus harm is always possible under laissez faire, in violation of the
uncertainty corollary. Laissez faire must therefore be rejected.
C. A Reverse Payment Cap Allows Consumer Harm
Capping the amount of any reverse payment fares no better.
Placing a cap on the amount of a reverse payment can limit the high
end of the range of possible settlements. 133 But the high endpoint in
the range depends upon Generic's litigation costs and its rate of
duopoly profit, in addition to the amount of the cap. 134 So long as
Generic's litigation costs are non-zero, a reverse payment cap in any
amount, including one that caps any payment at litigation cost, can
never guarantee that settlement will not harm consumers. 135 This is

132.
133.
134.

See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra note 60.
From note 60, I have PT + [LG q] for the capped high endpoint,
DG

which

depends on Generic litigation cost L0 and duopoly profit DG. From the same note, the
high endpoint is T - (1 - P)H +
in the multiple generic case.
DG

135.

From note 60 I have PT + [G ] for the capped high endpoint. For q
DG

0,

this exceeds PT and therefore involves delay. Delay harms consumers.
In the multiple generic case, for a reverse payment cap q I found in note 60 an
upper bound of E < T - (1 - P)H + q+LG. Letting q = 0 and subtracting PT, I have
DG

(1

-

P)T i -

+ L, which is positive. So even with a reverse payment capped at
T)DG'

zero there is delay. Because the upper bound is increasing in the payment cap q,
greater caps bring even more delay. Because hastening is required to prevent
consumer harm in the multiple generic case, this shows that no reverse payment cap
can save consumers from harm.
I am not aware of any other statement of this point at this level of generality. It
has been recognized that a litigation cost rule fails to ban some settlements that
harm consumers, but some commentators have failed to give even this limited
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because, as I show in Part I.C.2, Brand and Generic may treat the
entry date as a settlement currency even when the reverse payment
is zero. If Generic expects to pay litigation costs, it may be willing to
compensate Brand for a settlement that avoids those costs, simply
by agreeing to delay. 136
There is, however, another kind of payment regulation that can
create a guarantee against delay: a reverse payment ban plus a
minimum required obverse payment from Generic to Brand. I
consider this policy option in Part V.B.2.
D. Shortcomings of the Principleof Insufficient Reason as Applied
In Part III.C., I indicate that some scholars have tried to
respond to uncertainty about the settlement entry date by
assuming, quite arbitrarily, that all possible entry dates under
settlement are equally likely. For the benefit of those who are
comfortable with the arbitrariness of the principle of insufficient
reason, I wish briefly to consider a second obstacle to its application.
The usefulness of the principle is that it can be applied to determine
the amount of a cap to impose on reverse payments. That is, the cap
can be chosen to ensure that the average settlement entry date,
determined using the principle, involves no delay. I now show that

statement the prominence that it deserves. Willig and Bigelow bury it by assuming
that the parties always make deals that achieve the unique Nash bargaining
solution, allowing them to avoid coping with the range of possible settlement dates
actually available to the parties. Willig & Bigelow, supra note 13, at 665. Edlin et al.,
supra note 13, at 22, recognize it in passing when they write: "the settlement is
anticompetitive . . . if (but only if) the reverse payment exceeds the patent holder's
avoided litigation costs." I take the "but only if' to be a recognition that while all
settlements involving a reverse payment in excess of litigation cost are normally
anticompetitive, it does not also hold that all anticompetitive settlements must
involve a payment in excess of litigation cost. They make this point at greater length
in Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 631-33. It is discussed in
three other places. See Davis, supra note 10, at 291-95; Elhauge & Krueger, supra
note 14, at 313-19; Hemphill, Payingfor Delay, supra note 54, at 1594-95 (making
the point in both the single and multiple entry models).
136. Elhauge and Krueger recognize that even settlements without a reverse
payment can harm consumers but conclude that this immediately demands rule of
reason analysis for such settlements. See supra note 14, at 329 (" [P]atent settlements
that exclude entry without any reverse payment are . . . usually anticompetitive.
However, such settlements are not always anticompetitive, so a broader array of
rebuttal would be advisable."). This train of reasoning lacks the benefit of the
uncertainty corollary. Without the uncertainty corollary, it is unclear whether the
average settlement will harm consumers and case-by-case adjudication becomes
necessary.
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applying the principle in this way is more expensive for enforcers
than applying a litigation cost rule, which bans all settlements in
excess of litigation cost. 1 3 7
If I take the midpoint of the settlement range as the average
settlement, as the principle of insufficient reason would require,
then consumers are not necessarily harmed under a reverse
payment cap. The midpoint of the range can fall earlier than the
litigation entry date, particularly if there is no cap on any obverse
payment. 138 To determine which reverse payment caps meet the
expected protection standard by not harming consumers at the
midpoint of the settlement range, it is necessary to know the
maximum reverse payment cap beyond which consumers are
harmed at the midpoint. This maximum depends on the litigation
costs of the parties as well as Generic's duopoly profit rate and the
private surplus created by monopoly.139 This imposes an additional
information cost in applying the principle of insufficient reason

137.

See supra note 120 and accompanying text.

+

138.
Placing a cap on the amount of an obverse payment limits the low end of
the range of possible settlements. In note 60, I observed that Generic will settle for
7T
(PT - E)D0 - L 0 . I now choose some iT = -o that satisfies this condition as my
maximum obverse payment. I have that Brand is willing to hasten entry if EMB
(T - E)DB + o

PTMB + (1 - P)TDB - LB. Rearranging, I obtain E > PT - [ B+0]. As
MB-DB

o falls, the lower bound increases.
multiple generic case.
139.

From note 60, I have

A similar argument establishes this in the

for the lower end of the range and

LG+LB

LG+q

MB-DG-DB

the

upper

end.

Solving

for

the

q*

for

DG

that

equalizes

them

I

obtain

q* =

DGLB+LG(2DG-MB+DB) Observing that MB - DB - DG is the private
surplus, S, created by
MB-DB-DG

monopoly, I have q* = DGLB

(DG-S). Because this q* equalizes the bounds in relation

to the litigation entry date, and the upper bound

G

DG

is increasing in q, a reverse

payment in excess of q* pulls the midpoint above the litigation entry date, suggesting
harm to consumers; a cap below q* pulls the midpoint below the litigation entry date,
suggesting a lack of harm to consumers. This makes q* the maximum cap beyond
which consumers are harmed. A maximum cap for the multiple generic case may be
obtained by a similar process. It is

PH [DG+DBMB- (1 - P)(T - H) +

MBG

DG - L0 . It

depends on more variables than the cap in the single entry case, including the

litigation entry date.
The existence of a maximum cap is possible but not guaranteed. For sufficiently
large S, I have q* < 0, which implies that the upper bound is so high that even a zero
cap on reverse payment cannot bring it down to the size of the lower bound. The
midpoint always harms consumers. The existence of a maximum cap is possible but
not guaranteed in the multiple entry case as well.
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relative to a litigation cost rule, for which only litigation cost must
be determined. 140
I also wish to identify an erroneous application of the principle
of insufficient reason in the literature. Elhauge and Krueger appear
to make the following argument. Generic's rate of profit loss with
delay is always smaller than Brand's rate of gain with delay.141 As a
result, if Generic's litigation costs approximate Brand's, 142 then
Generic will always be willing to agree to more delay than Brand
will be willing to agree to hastening. 143 This effect is presumably
compounded by the availability of a limited reverse payment, which
permits Brand to purchase a limited amount of additional delay
from Generic. 144 According to Elhauge and Krueger, because the
range is broader for Generic, I must conclude that the midpoint
exceeds the litigation entry date and therefore settlement always
harms consumers. 145 The problem with this argument is that it
assumes that Generic will not pay Brand for hastening. This
severely restricts the low end of the settlement range. I argue in
Part I.C.1 that this is not a reasonable assumption. The principle of
insufficient reason does not establish the existence of consumer
harm a priori.
V. CHOICE OF A RULE UNDER THE UNCERTAINTY COROLLARY

140.

Both rules

also require interpretation

of the terms of any settlement

agreement. See infra Part V.B.

141.

See supra Part I.B.1.

142. Cf Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 14, at 313 (assuming that the litigation
costs of Brand and Generic are equal).
143. The argument of Elhauge and Krueger may be represented formally using
the notation defined in note 60. In single entry, Brand's maximum hastening is
LB
' whereas Generic's maximum delay is -.
Because if monopoly guarantees a
MB-DB

DG

private surplus, then MB - DB > DG,

if LB

<
MB-DB

DG

=

L0 . See id. at 318 (" [E]ven with

zero reverse payment and weak patent, the middle of the settlement range always
exceeds both the expected litigation exclusion period and the optimal patent
exclusion period. If we assume all settlements in the bargaining range are equally
likely, settlements without reverse payments are usually anticompetitive for weak
patents as well as strong.").
144. Cf id. at 315 ( [E]ven with zero reverse payment and a strong patent, the
middle of the settlement range always exceeds . . . the expected litigation exclusion
period[.]").
145. See id. at 313-23 ("Any delay in entry increases the patent holder's profits
by more than it decreases the entrant's profits . . . . Therefore, the patent holder will
be less willing to accept a shorter exclusion period in order to avoid litigation costs
than the entrant is willing to accept a longer exclusion period to avoid litigation
costs. This will push the range of possible settlement exclusions higher.").
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The uncertainty corollary requires that antitrust choose a rule
that allows no settlement to harm consumers. I consider three rules
that meet this requirement: a blanket ban on all patent entry
settlements (a "settlement ban"), a requirement that any settlement
include a (net) obverse payment from Generic to Brand in an
amount large enough to make Generic unwilling to settle for delay
(an "obverse payment rule"), and a rule of reason that examines
settlements on a case-by-case basis and prohibits those that harm
consumers. All three rules meet the requirement of the uncertainty
corollary in that they purport to guarantee no harm to consumers. I
argue that a settlement ban is the best of these rules.
In deciding between these rules, I take the cost of enforcement
to enforcers, such as the FTC, to be a legitimate criterion, but not
the cost of litigation to firms or to the court system. 146 Antitrust is
interested exclusively in consumer value. 147 In the standard entry
model, consumers pay neither court administration costs nor
litigation costs. I have shown that, as a result, a reduction in
litigation costs has no effect on consumer value in single entry 48
and actually reduces it in multiple entry. 149 I consider the cost of
enforcement, however, because consumers benefit from enforcement
and enforcers have limited resources. I assume that each of the
three rules that I consider is equally effective at guaranteeing no
harm to consumers, but the enforcement costs of this efficacy
differ. 150 I assume further that it is in the interest of consumers that
antitrust apply the rule that is cheapest to enforce, perhaps because

146.
Standard frivolous litigation models treat court filing fees, which are a
proxy for court administration costs, as an item separate from each party's litigation
costs, which latter include such things as attorney fees. Cf. MICELI, supra note 58, at

188 ( [O]verall litigation costs . .
consist of the total filing costs plus trial costs for
those cases not dropped or settled[j"); Shapiro, supra note 14, at 394 ("Private
benefits [of settlement] include the avoidance of litigation costs and the resolution of
uncertainty. Social benefits include savings on court costs and/or reduction of
congestion in the court system.").

147.
148.
149.

See supra note 106.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.

150.
This means that I ignore relative error costs and therefore error costs
generally. I do not consider error costs because I know nothing about, for example,
the probability that a settlement ban might incorrectly treat a license as an entry
settlement or that a rule of reason might misidentify a litigation entry date. In this
regard my analysis is incomplete. For a brief introduction to the modelling of legal
error, see MICELI, supra note 58, at 184.
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a less expensive rule can be applied to more conduct, and therefore
eliminate more harm. 15 1
I do not compare the effects of the three rules on litigation rates,
but some tentative observations are in order here. A settlement ban
will probably reduce the number of settlements relative to the other
two rules, reducing the cost of enforcing the antitrust laws against
them. To the extent that it also drives up litigation rates regarding
patent validity,152 it creates positive externalities by subjecting to
final adjudication the validity of more patents. 153 It also drives up
litigation costs, but, as I have just observed, these can be ignored. 154
It may also dissuade some parties from commencing litigation at
all.1 55 The effect of this change on consumer value takes me outside
of the standard entry model and I do not consider it.
Before turning to a comparison of the three rules, and showing
that a settlement ban is the best, I first provide more detail on how
a settlement ban would work.
A. InstitutionalDetail Regarding a Settlement Ban
I propose a ban on all agreements that have the effect of
preventing Generic from making a Paragraph IV certification15 6 or
entering the market immediately after doing so. The ban would be
an instance of the per se rule against anticompetitive agreements
associated with Section 1 of the Sherman Act1 57 and its violation

151.
For a discussion of error costs in antitrust that emphasizes the distinction
between the size of the coverage area of a rule and the error cost it inflicts within its

coverage area, see Ramsi A. Woodcock, Per Se in Itself: How Bans Reduce Error in
Antitrust
12
(2016)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896453).

152. Cf C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, EarningExclusivity: Generic Drug
Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 977-78 (2011)
(preventing Generic from enjoying 180-day exclusivity when it enters pursuant to a
settlement could increase the amount of litigation).
153.
Challenging an invalid patent confers a benefit on future users who need
not themselves sue to gain access to the art. To the extent that an increase in

litigation leads to more findings of invalidity, it also creates this positive externality.
See Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 152, at 978 (" [T]he invalidation of patents is a
public good[.]).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 147-50.
155.
Cf id. at 981-84 (discussing consequences of deterring challenges through a
rule depriving Generic of the right to obtain 180-day exclusivity pursuant to a
settlement).

156.
157.

See supra Part I.A.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2013);

see generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

FEDERAL

ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 158-59, 279 (4th
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would lead to all the penalties normally available for a violation of a
per se rule under that statute. 15 8 The rule would require that
Generic, having made a Paragraph IV certification, defend itself
through to final judgment if sued and Brand, having decided to sue,
prosecute its suit through to final judgment unless it wishes to give
up and settle for immediate entry. The rule would neither require
Brand to sue nor require Generic to make a Paragraph IV
certification, but it would ban any agreement that would prohibit
Generic from making a certification. The rule ensures that if Brand
wants Generic barred by law from the market, Brand must obtain a
court order.
It has been observed that every license is a settlement of
sorts. 15 9 Every agreement by Generic to pay damages is of course
also a license. A rule that bans all settlements, bans all licenses. I
do not propose to ban all settlements, but only settlements that
have the effect of limiting entry. My rule would not ban an
agreement by Generic to pay royalties to Brand unless the royalty is
structured to preclude immediate entry by Generic, perhaps by use
of a very high rate for all or part of the patent term, or unless the
royalty contains some other device that has the effect of limiting
entry. 16 0

ed. 2011) (explaining that agreements intended to raise price or decrease output are
illegal per se under the antitrust laws).
158. See generally id. at 159, 724-27 (indicating that a naked restraint is a
felony under the antitrust laws and discussing the measure of monetary damages
that are also available); see also Valley Drug Co., supra note 10, at 1304 ("An
agreement between competitors to allocate markets is, as the district court noted,
clearly anticompetitive. Such an agreement has the obvious tendency to diminish
output and raise prices.").
159. Shapiro, supra note 14, at 392 ("Virtually every patent license can be
viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute: the royalty rate presumably reflects the
two parties' strengths or weaknesses in patent litigation in conjunction with the
licensee's ability to invent around the patent."); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 533 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding this observation to
undermine the rationale for any regulation of patent settlements, let alone a ban on
them). Shapiro also argues that "there are invariably gains from settling a patent
dispute, even ignoring the savings associated with reduced litigation costs and
uncertainty." Shapiro, supra note 14, at 397. I show elsewhere that this is not true
for entry settlements. Ramsi A. Woodcock, Product Innovation and Settlements of

Drug Patent Litigation That Limit Generic Entry 34-37 (September 6, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2702474).
160. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 153, at 269 ("Alpha may sue Beta for patent
infringement and the two parties settle their dispute by an agreement that Beta may
go ahead with its plans but pay Alpha a royalty. The license agreement itself is not
subject to antitrust challenge, and the fact that it is a settlement cannot make it any
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Implementation of the rule would require acceptance by courts
interpreting Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court in
Actavis endorsed a rule of reason for reverse payment
settlements. 16 1 My proposed ban was not before the Court and was
not ruled out by it. Indeed, it resolves some of the concerns
expressed by the majority in its opinion. The majority showed an
interest in accuracy in adjudication and in minimizing enforcement
costs, both of which support a ban once the uncertainty corollary is
taken into account. The majority embraced a rule of reason in
Actavis because it rightly worried that a litigation cost rule is an
imperfect proxy for consumer harm and must be set aside in some
cases. 162 It also recognized the need to avoid the cost of an inquiry
into the litigation entry date by suggesting that courts treat reverse
payment size as a proxy for consumer harm where possible. 163
Because the majority did not have the benefit of the uncertainty
corollary, it could not have known that a settlement ban both does a
better job than a litigation cost rule of avoiding consumer harm and,
as I will discuss shortly, is no more expensive than a litigation cost
rule. 164

My proposed rule would not prevent settlement for immediate
entry by Generic. As a result, some weak patents may settle for
immediate entry, causing the average Paragraph IV outcome,
including both settlement and litigation outcomes, to involve
hastening. In this case a settlement ban would not achieve for
consumers the value they would expect under litigation but instead
would bring them greater value, at least under the standard entry
model. The uncertainty corollary cares only about the absence of
harm, so allowing settlement for immediate entry does not violate

worse.");

Daniel

G.

Swanson

and

William

J.

Baumol,

Reasonable and

Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market
Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10-15 (2005) (discussing methods of identifying
unreasonable royalties as part of the project of preventing holdups in the licensing of
standard essential patents).

161.

Supra note 11, at 2237-38.

162. Id. at 2236 ("Where a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not
the same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of
patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.").

163.

Id. at 2236-37

( [A]n antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible

administratively than [some believe] . . . . [T]he size of the unexplained reverse
payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent's weakness, all without
forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.").

164.

See infra Part V.B.
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it, but to the extent that allowing settlement for immediate entry
starts to undermine the purpose of a patent term, the result is a
source of concern. 16 5 The carve-out for settlements for immediate
entry is not essential to my proposed ban and may be eliminated. I
include it only because I do not think it will lead to much hastening
and I wish to propose a rule that deviates as little as possible from
the present regime.
My proposal is nearly identical in its terms, though not in its
effect, to the "earned exclusivity" proposal of Hemphill and
Lemley. 166 The difference is that I would make violation of the rule
a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, thereby
triggering strict penalties that would have the effect of banning
nearly all entry settlements. Hemphill and Lemley would only strip
Generic of its first-filer exclusivity by way of penalty, 167 but would
continue to allow Generic to settle for delay. 168 The rule meets the
protection standard only if guesses by Hemphill and Lemley,
regarding the settlements that Brand and Generic will choose once
their rule is applied, actually hold.169 Earned exclusivity is not a
dominant strategy.
B. The Case for a Settlement Ban
I now argue that a settlement ban is to be preferred to a rule of
reason or an obverse payment rule because it is less expensive to
enforce.
1. In Relation to a Rule of Reason
A settlement ban is less expensive to enforce than a rule of
reason because it never requires enforcers to determine the
litigation entry date or the amount of litigation costs, as required

165. See infra note 190 and accompanying paragraph.
166. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 152, at 949 (imposing a penalty unless
Generic "successfully defeats the patent owner . . .. obtains a settlement that
permits entry without delay, or can enter the market without delay because the
patent holder does not sue for infringement.").
167. Id. Because penalties under my proposal do not presuppose the existence of
first-filer exclusivity, my rule also extends to settlements that would prevent Generic
from making a Paragraph IV certification to begin with.
168. Cf. id. at 950 ("To be clear, we do not oppose settlements that simply divide
the remaining patent term by choosing a date at which the generic firm may enter.").
169. Id. at 978 (predicting that "delayed-entry settlement will mostly disappear"
(emphasis added)).
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under a rule of reason. The Court in Actavis imposed a rule of
reason on reverse payment settlements. 170 In order to apply it, a
court must check the settlement entry date against the litigation
entry date to determine whether the settlement delays entry and
harms consumers. This requires that the court be able to determine
the litigation entry date. 171 The Court in Actavis indicated that the
size of a reverse payment relative to the defendant's litigation cost
might be used as a proxy for consumer harm. 172 This requires that
the court determine litigation cost. Either way, the rule of reason
requires that enforcers determine a quantity that they need not
determine in enforcing a settlement ban.
Enforcement of a settlement ban requires only identification of
the existence of an agreement and interpretation of its terms to
determine whether it sets a date of entry. A statutory reporting
requirement1 73 makes identification relatively easy. Interpretation
may be harder if the effect of the agreement is to restrict entry, but
its language does not purport to do so. 1 74 For example, an abovemarket license may hide an entry restriction. Regardless, imposing
a rule of reason also requires engaging in these activities, in

170.
171.

See supra note 11.
See Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 617 ("[T]he

correct antitrust analysis must be based on what was reasonably known to the
parties about patent validity and infringement at the time they entered into their
settlement.").
172.
This is the effect of the Court's embrace in Actavis of a rule of reason
combined with a presumption against reverse payments in excess of litigation cost.

See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236-37; Aaron Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra
note 14, at 617-19 (rejecting the argument that under Actavis a court must litigate
patent validity or infringement but acknowledging that sometimes a court must
consider "the risk of losing the patent case" in determining whether an antitrust
violation exists).
173.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,

Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 1112, 117 Stat. 2461 (2003) (requiring Brand and Generic to
file with the FTC the text of any agreement written or oral regarding the
"manufacture, marketing or sale" of a drug that is the subject of a Paragraph IV
certification). An important gap in this requirement is that it does not include
agreements not to file a Paragraph IV certification.

174. Cf Fed. Trade Comm'n, Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade
Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003: Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014 2 (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreements-filled-federal-tradecommission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement/160113mmafyl4rpt.pdf
(stating that for 8 of 160 Paragraph IV patent settlement agreements filed with the
FTC in fiscal year 2014 the existence of a reverse payment could not be determined
because "it is not clear from the face of each settlement agreement whether certain
provisions act as compensation to the generic patent challenger").
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addition to determining the litigation entry date or cost. That makes
it more expensive.
2. In Relation to an Obverse Payment Rule
An obverse payment reduces Generic's willingness to delay
because it offsets the litigation cost savings that compensate
Generic for delay. 175 The obverse payment requirement that makes
Generic unwilling to delay, without discouraging Generic from any
amount of hastening, is similar to a litigation cost rule, but instead
of prohibiting Brand from making payments in excess of Brand's
litigation cost, it requires Generic to spend an amount equal to
Generic's litigation cost. 176

Depending on the circumstances of the settlements to which it is
applied, an obverse payment ban is sometimes equivalent to a

175.

Consider Figure 12. If Generic makes a payment equal to its litigation cost,

.

-

then its settlement line will shift down to become coextensive with its litigation line
(viet shifts down to equal v/it). This pushes the maximum delay to which Generic will
agree (labeled "max") to the left until it hits the litigation entry date (marked
"expected entry"). Thus Generic will not be willing to accept any delay.
I note that Generic will continue to be willing to settle for hastening; the
minimum entry date is determined by Brand's profit lines and not Generic's. If
Generic's litigation cost payment goes to Brand, then Brands settlement line, ve,
will rise, pushing the minimum entry date to which Brand will agree (marked "min"
in the figure) to the left. Thus an obverse payment will make Brand willing to accept
a greater hastening of entry.
176. I use the notation defined in note 60. The entry date Generic will accept
must satisfy (T - E)D + 7T
(1 - P)TD0 - L 0 , which rearranges to -(PT - E)D0
L0
w, from which it is clear that for an E that is just equal to the litigation entry
date PT, L 0
-7n. For any higher E to be precluded, -w must equal L 0
This does not hold in the multiple entry case. In that case, an obverse payment
requirement is ineffective at limiting entry to dates less than T - H. See infra note
178. For entry dates greater than T - H, Generic's entry date is constrained by
(T - E)D + 7T
(1 - P)HD0 - L0 , which rearranges to
[(1 - P)H - (T - E)]D0 - L 0 < if.

(1)

Rewritten as an equality, (1) gives the obverse payment required to preclude
settlements for dates greater than E. To find the obverse payment that prevents
harm to consumers, I need to know the threshold for consumer harm. It is
determined by McE + (T - E)Dc PTMc + (1 - P)(HDc + (T - H)Fc), where Fc is
This rearranges

to E

PT L

- [PH

+

consumer value under competition.

(T - H)] [Fc-DC]. This gives the range of entry dates that do not harm consumers. The
DC-MC

maximum date is given by rewriting it as an equality. To find the obverse payment
that precludes settlements for dates above this maximum, I substitute this equality
into (1), treating (1) as an equality. It is clear that calculating the amount of the
obverse payment requires knowledge of the litigation entry date PT as well as a
number of other variables.

2016]

UNCERTAINTYAND

REVERSE PAYMENTS

147

settlement ban and sometimes more expensive to enforce than one,
but never less expensive. As a result, it is more costly on average
than a settlement ban. In single entry, an obverse payment rule
requires a determination of litigation costs in addition to the terms
of the settlement. This makes the rule slightly more expensive than
a ban, which only requires interpretation of the agreement.
In the multiple entry case Generic is indifferent, or very nearly
so, 177 between any two settlements for entry more than 180 days
before patent expiry. As a result, Generic may either be made
willing to settle for any date greater than 180 days before patent
expiry or precluded from settling for any of them. 178 If the threshold
date beyond which consumers are harmed falls within this period,
an obverse payment rule will not be able to preclude only entry
dates that harm consumers. In such a situation, an obverse
payment rule that meets the uncertainty corollary by precluding all
settlements that could harm consumers must have the effect of
banning all settlements and therefore cannot be distinguished in
effect from an outright settlement ban. 179
An obverse payment rule may, however, be used to prevent
delay relative to dates within 180 days of patent expiry. Because in
multiple entry some amount of hastening is required for avoidance
of harm to consumers, an obverse payment rule must prevent delay
relative to an entry date that is in advance of the litigation entry
date. This means that the range of litigation entry dates for which
an obverse payment rule is possible is only a fraction of the 180 days
before patent expiry. It seems reasonable to assume that most
patents are not so strong as to have litigation entry dates so close to
patent expiry. Even if most are, there is an additional problem.
Even when feasible, an obverse payment rule is very expensive
to administer in the multiple entry case. For maximum entry dates
less than 180 days before patent expiry, knowledge of the litigation

177.
If there is a positive interest rate, then Generic will not be completely
indifferent. Generic will place a higher value on its 180 days of exclusivity if it enjoys
them sooner rather than later. If the interest rate is small, then for very weak
patents Generic may not be willing to agree to delay until patent expiry. Cf.

Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 54, at 1593 ( [A] generic firm might prefer
[delay] so long as [any] increase in projected profits [from delay] exceeds the discount

-

from the delay in their receipt.").
178. From note 60, I have that for E < T - H, Generic is willing to settle if IT
-PHDG - LG, which is independent of E. So if iT meets this condition then any E T

H is acceptable to Generic. If iT does not meet this condition, then no E is acceptable.

179.

Cf supra note 176 (providing an algebraic description of the operation of an

obverse payment rule).
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entry date, monopoly, duopoly, and competition value for consumers
and Generic, as well as Generic's litigation cost, are all required to
determine the minimum amount of the obverse payment required to
avoid harm to consumers in multiple entry. 18 0 This makes an
obverse payment rule as expensive as a rule of reason. Because
multiple entry could be more common than single entry, 181 these
final two objections are particularly important. They show that an
obverse payment rule is just a settlement ban over most patent
strengths and too expensive over the rest of them. I conclude that a
settlement ban is a better means of complying with the uncertainty
corollary.
I wish to highlight a final objection, which applies both to an
obverse payment rule and a rule of reason. Both rules permit
settlements that hasten entry. A rule of reason would use case-bycase analysis to cull only settlements that delay entry. 182 An obverse
payment rule would render Generic unwilling to settle for delay, but
still willing to accept hastening. 183 Although I have said that the
protection standard as applied to the standard entry model has no
objection to hastening because it does not harm consumers, I have
also pointed out that hastening, if taken to an extreme, would have
the effect of eliminating patent protection, which is not a desirable
result. 184 Because a settlement ban ensures that there is neither
hastening nor delay, 185 it raises less of a concern for the safety of
patent law than do the other two rules. I discuss this problem in
greater detail in another work. 186

180.
181.

See supra note 176.
See Edlin et al., The Actavis Inference, supra note 14, at 621 ("In practice, in

many or even most cases, the assumption that further generic entry will occur
following a settlement and the 180-day exclusivity period is empirically correct.");
Kobayashi et al., supra note 16, at 91 ("The single-entrant model does not account for
key institutional features of the Hatch-Waxman Act . . . that render the postinvalidation duopoly assumption unrealistic when there are multiple entrants.").

182.

See, e.g., Nat'l Soc. of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688

(1978) ( [Rule of reason analysis] focuses directly on the challenged restraint's
impact on competitive conditions.").

183.
184.

See supra note 175.
See supra Part III.D.

185.
For a way in which my proposed implementation might cause a settlement
ban to allow some hastening, see supra note 165 and accompanying text.

186.

See Woodcock, supra note 127.
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CONCLUSION

Antitrust's mission is to prevent harm to consumers. In the
patent context, this must be understood to mean harm relative to
the level of consumer welfare that patent law would achieve
through application of its rules by the courts. It follows that a
failure to regulate patent litigation settlements, in the hope that
this will result in settlements that improve upon the outcome that
would otherwise obtain under litigation, is misguided. Antitrust's
job is to prevent harmful settlements, not to allow beneficial
settlements.
I have shown that when they are uncertain about the entry date
upon which drug makers will settle, policymakers must limit
allowed settlement entry dates to those that guarantee no harm to
consumers. I have shown, as well, that banning all settlements that
fix a date of entry is the best way to achieve that. The alternative of
a cap on the size of any "reverse payment" that Brand may make to
Generic allows harmful settlement entry dates. Other alternatives,
such as a rule requiring Generic to make a payment to Brand, or a
rule of reason, are either unworkable or more expensive to enforce.
These results hold both when only a single generic may enter the
market before patent expiry and when multiple generics may
eventually enter and drive prices down to competitive levels before
patent expiry.

TENNESSEE L4WREIEW

150

After Generic Entry

Before Generic Entry

N

Figure 1

11

[Vol. 84.99
After Patent Expiry

Figure 2 1

Figure 31

0

Monopoly

Profit

PD

DWL

I

Duopoly

X

rofit 6

qM

qD

Figure 4

PC =

qC

0
Figure 6

Figure 5

0

C.)

Monopoly
Profit

L

PD1

DWL

Duopol Profit

qM

qD

Figure 7

Profit

qC

0

Figure 8

Figure 9

I

I

-

Monopoly

PC =

PD

DWL
qM

Duopol

rofit
qD

-PC= 0

qc

2016]

UNCERTAINTYAND

REVERSE PAYMENTS

151

Figures 1 to 9 on the precedingpage show the value to consumers,
Generic, and Brand (rows 1, 2 and 3, respectively) before Generic
entry, after it but before patent expiry, and after patent expiry
(columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively). The vertical axis in each figure is
price and the horizontal is quantity. Each gray area represents the
value for the party associatedwith the row in which the figure
appears. The diagonal in each figure represents demand. The letters
p and q represent the prevailingprice and quantity levels,
respectively. The subscriptM stands for monopoly, which prevails
before Generic entry. The subscript D stands for duopoly, which
prevails after Generic entry, but before patent expiry. The subscript C
stands for competition, which prevails after patent expiry. DWL
stands for deadweight loss. The figures are discussed in Part I.B. 1.
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Figure 10187
This figure and Figure 11 are a pair. They are explained in footnote
50. The vertical axis in both figures is price and the horizontal is
quantity. The diagonal in both figures represents demand.

187. This figure and Figure 11 are inspired by the division of static value used in
Vincenzo Denicol6, Do Patents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 EcoN. POL'Y 679,
686-87 (2007) and also found in Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 34 RAND J. EcoN. 106, 107 (1990).
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Figure 11

This figure and Figure 10 are a pair. They are explained in footnote
50. The vertical axis in both figures is price and the horizontal is
quantity. The diagonal in both figures represents demand.

154

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.99

set
UB
lit
UB

0

min expected
entry

max

V

lit

p

patent
expires

Figure 12
This figure is discussed in PartsI.B and . C. The vertical axis
represents value to consumers, Brand, or Generic. The horizontal axis
represents time of market entry by Generic. CS and v refer to
consumer value andprivate firm value, respectively. The subscripts G
and B refer to Generic and Brand, respectively, and those of set and
lit to settlement and litigation, respectively. Thus, for example, vset is
Generic's value in settlement. Expected entry is an arbitrarily-chosen
litigationentry date. Min is the earliest time of entry for which Brand
will settle, given that litigationentry date. Max is the latest time of
entry for which Generic will settle, given that litigationentry date.
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CS
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entry
Figure 13

This figure is discussed in PartI.D. The vertical axis represents value
to consumers, Brand, or Generic. The horizontal axis represents time
of market entry by Generic. CS and v refer to consumer value and
private firm value, respectively. VB is Brand's value and VG is
Generic's value. The kinked lines represent value in settlement for the
party indicated in the correspondinglabel; the straight lines
represent value in litigation. The Generic and Brand litigation value
lines are drawn for the case of zero litigationcost. Expected entry is
an arbitrarily-chosenlitigation entry date. The left-most vertical
dashed line is the earliest time of entry for which Brand will settle,
given that litigation entry date. The second vertical dashed line from
the left is the latest time of entry under settlement for which, given
that litigationentry date, consumers are not harmed by settlement.
The right-most vertical dashed line is the latest time of entry for
which Generic will settle, given that litigationentry date.

